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Abstract
Are we underestimating the costs of patent protection? Scholars have
long recognized that patent law is a double-edged sword. While patents
promote innovation, they also limit the number of people who can benefit
from new inventions. In the past, policy makers striving to balance the
costs and benefits of patents have analyzed patent law through the lens of
traditional, neoclassical economics. This Article argues that this approach
is fundamentally flawed because traditional economics rely on an
inaccurate oversimplification: that individuals and firms always maximize
profits. In actuality, so-called “productive inefficiencies” often prevent
profit maximization. For example, cognitive biases, bounded rationality,
habituation, and opportunism all contribute to productive inefficiencies
that harm individuals, firms, and ultimately society. Moreover, a variety of
theoretical analyses and empirical studies demonstrate that robust
competition reduces productive inefficiencies. Consequently, patents that
substantially limit competition exacerbate productive inefficiencies and an
important effect of patent law therefore has been systematically
overlooked. This Article begins to fill this void and demonstrates that
consideration of productive inefficiencies sheds new light on numerous
unresolved and contentious debates in patent law.
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“The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”
Nobel Laureate J.R. Hicks (1935)1
INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most innovative sectors of the
U.S. economy. Every year, pharmaceutical companies invest tens of
billions of dollars in research and development discovering new drugs.2
Many of these discoveries are protected with patents and even some critics
of patent law concede that pharmaceutical patents generally promote the
discovery of new drugs.3 But the innovative successes of pharmaceutical
companies may conceal puzzling failures. According to some
commentators, pharmaceutical companies have failed to adopt modern
manufacturing techniques that are common in other industries; as a result,
1. J. R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935).
2. PHRMA, 2013 PROFILE: BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY 31 (2013),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMA%20Profile%202013.pdf.
3. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 106 (2008) (noting that “managers in the
pharmaceutical and chemical industries consider[] patents as essential to developing and marketing
30 percent or more of inventions”).
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pharmaceutical manufacturing is comparatively slow, expensive, and errorprone.4 Manufacturing mediocrity in the pharmaceutical industry is
particularly surprising because even modest improvements could
substantially increase profits.5 In fact, pharmaceutical companies spend
more on manufacturing than they do on research and development.6
How could pharmaceutical companies be so good at the difficult task of
discovering new drugs but so bad at the comparatively easy task of
embracing modern manufacturing techniques? Although many factors
affect drug manufacturing,7 this Article identifies an overlooked and
unlikely culprit: strong pharmaceutical patents. Moreover, this Article
argues that the subpar manufacturing of medicines not only undercuts the
profits of pharmaceutical companies but also reduces welfare for all of
society.
Without a doubt, innovation produces massive social benefits. Through
technological improvements many people today live longer, healthier,
more productive lives.8 Patents can be a key driver of socially beneficial
innovation. Discovering new inventions often requires substantial time,
effort, and capital, and patents encourage inventors and businesses to
invest in research and development by providing inventors with exclusive
rights to their discoveries.9 Unfortunately, although patents have great
4. W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 500 (2014) (arguing that “[p]harmaceutical
manufacturing has lagged far behind other industries in adopting modern manufacturing
techniques”).
5. Id. at 504 (“Tens of billions of dollars are spent annually on [pharmaceutical]
manufacturing inefficiencies. Efficiency increases consequently carry large potential benefits.”); see
Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 574 (1969)
(noting that “[c]ost reduction will enable the monopolist to increase its profits”).
6. Price, supra note 4, at 497 & n.39 (stating that for pharmaceutical companies
“[m]anufacturing is either the largest or secondlargest expense” behind sales and marketing).
7. See, e.g., id. at 510–12 (arguing that regulatory hurdles and insufficient patent protection
undermine incentives to develop improved manufacturing processes in the pharmaceutical
industry).
8. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that innovation produced almost
75% of the growth in the U.S. economy since World War II. ARTI RAI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH &
PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 2 (2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/migrated/Patent_Reform-paper.pdf. Other estimates are lower, but are still significant.
See COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, INNOVATE AMERICA 36 (2005), available at
http://www.compete.org/publications/detail/202/innovate-america/ (noting that innovation generates
productivity that has accounted for approximately half of U.S. GDP growth over the past fifty
years); see also JUDY ESTRIN, CLOSING THE INNOVATION GAP: REIGNITING THE SPARK OF CREATIVITY
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 142 (2009), available at http://www.books24x7.com/marc.asp?bookid=
29867 (“The growth of the U.S. economy has become dependent on the small, innovative
companies that have thrived for decades in places like Silicon Valley.”). However, not all patented
inventions produce commercially successful innovations. See infra Section III.C.
9. For citations regarding the incentive benefits of patent rights, see infra note 51.
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capacity to benefit society, they can also reduce social welfare. For
example, owners of exclusive patent rights sometimes raise the costs of
products and services that incorporate new inventions and some customers
may be unable to afford these higher prices as a result.10 Furthermore,
patent owners can use their rights to obstruct technological progress by
preventing others from building upon their patented inventions.11
Balancing costs and benefits is thus vital to the development of
effective patent laws, and lawmakers strive to calibrate this trade-off by
adjusting the contours of patent rights.12 Unfortunately, empirically
measuring the full costs and benefits of patent law is infeasible (if not
impossible) and this prevents a mathematical optimization.13 Instead,
numerous government entities, including Congress, the courts, and the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, define the contours of patent law through
their activities and interactions.14 In this process, the identification of
which costs and benefits stem from patent protection is critical. If
10. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2113
(2013) (noting that certain “patents would, if valid, give [the owner of the patents] the exclusive
right” to perform certain medical tests).
11. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990) (noting the social costs of patents, which include reduction of
competition).
12. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 21 (2003) (discussing patent law’s purported design to achieve a
cost–benefit trade-off).
13. See id. at 9 (“The economic case for abolishing intellectual property rights has not been
made. But neither economic theory nor empirical evidence enables a ringing endorsement of any
complete body of [patents or copyrights].”); William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak
Patents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1909, 1934 (2013); Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent
Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 931 (asserting that “the patent system does not engage, nor is it
equipped to engage, in macroscopic cost-benefit analyses to determine the ideal scope of particular
exclusive rights”); Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 7 (2004) (“How much propertization is too much? That is
an empirical question to which no one knows the answer.”). Economist Fritz Machlup famously
concluded his study of the U.S. patent system, unsure of the system’s social utility, with the
following:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one.
But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible,
on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
80 (Comm. Print 1958).
14. See Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal
Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1251–53 (2004) (noting the relationship
between Congress and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue,
92 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402352 (discussing the “patent dialogue” between the branches of
the federal government).
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lawmakers, judges, and scholars systematically overlook substantial costs
or benefits from patent law, the patent system in the United States cannot
operate effectively. As the Nobel Prize winning economist Oliver
Williamson observed, “analysis influences the way the world is perceived,
including the power to delude and misguide as well as to illuminate and
instruct.”15
Today, traditional or “neoclassical” economics constitute the dominant
approach to identifying the costs and benefits of patent law. Under this
approach, patent rights benefit society by creating economic incentives to
discover, disclose, and commercialize new inventions but harm society by
allowing firms to raise prices above competitive levels.16 In describing
these costs and benefits, neoclassical economics is grounded on the
assumption that individuals and firms maximize profits.17 As a result, the
argument goes, when patent law is properly calibrated, the “invisible hand”
of the market will typically prompt self-interested firms to make decisions
that ultimately maximize social welfare.18
Although many economists embrace the profit-maximization
assumption, a growing group of economists does not.19 For example,
15. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 249 (1975); see also Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing
Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (asserting that “the abstract
level of economic thinking . . . drives most intellectual property policymaking”); Dennis D. Crouch,
The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 141, 141–42 (2008) (“Policymakers’ understanding of both the upside and downside of patent
protection is important so they can better calibrate the rights granted: making them strong enough to
help induce innovation and development while limiting monopolistic problems.”).
16. See infra Section I.A.
17. See ROGER S. FRANTZ, X-EFFICIENCY: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND APPLICATIONS 63 (1988)
(“The neoclassical assumption of rationality was applied in such a way as to make the production
process seem like a mechanical process and for the firm to be nothing other than an efficient
converter of inputs into their maximum outputs.”); HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, GENERAL X-EFFICIENCY
THEORY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 9 (1978) (“Let us recall that according to the neoclassical
theory all of the options are known and the prices of inputs and outputs are also known.”); N.
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 282–88 (6th ed. 2012) (“The goal of a
competitive firm is to maximize profit . . . .”); WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 250 (noting that
standard economic theory “assume[s] that the firm operates on its production function, which shows
the maximum output of product that can be realized from each feasible combination of factor
inputs”); Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 2; Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a
Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 209, 224 (1996) (noting that the basic operating
assumption under modern neoclassical economics is that “firms always seek to maximize their
profits”).
18. See MANKIW, supra note 17, at 11 (“[D]espite decentralized decision making and selfinterested decision makers, market economies have proven remarkably successful in organizing
economic activity to promote overall economic well-being.”).
19. According to one economist, “the hypothesis of profit maximization has mutated into an
axiom.” RICHARD E. CAVES, INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY IN SIX NATIONS 1 (1992); see also RICHARD E.
CAVES & DAVID R. BARTON, EFFICIENCY IN U.S. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1 (1990) (“[S]ome
economists declare [productive] inefficiency to lie outside the reach of analytically founded
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numerous economists assert that individuals do not maximize profits due
to cognitive biases, limited cognitive capacities, and bad habits.20 Others
have demonstrated that conflicts between principals and agents can prevent
firms from maximizing their profits.21 All of these economists agree that
inherent features of human behavior and interpersonal interaction often
prevent individuals and firms from maximizing their profits. Moreover,
such failure to maximize profits reduces social welfare.22 However, this
harm to society is not inevitable. Modern economists argue on both
theoretical and empirical grounds that competition drives individuals and
firms toward profit maximization and thus increases social welfare.23
Despite the importance of this economic scholarship, it is unfortunately
fragmented and widely dispersed. Some economists focus only on
individual obstacles to profit maximization and only analyze the effects of
competition in passing.24 Though other economists provide more fulsome
analyses, they also employ different terminology to describe circumstances that
prevent firms from maximizing their own profits, including “internal
inefficiency,”25 “organizational slack,”26 “productive inefficiency,”27
“technical inefficiency,”28 and “X-inefficiency.”29
economic analysis because the manager of an inefficient activity is failing to maximize its profits,
and the maximization of profits by the business is taken as equivalent to the maximization of utility
by the individual, a largely unquestioned axiom of economic analysis.”).
20. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 67–68; HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND
RATIONAL 198 (1957); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 22–39 (2008) (discussing cognitive bias); WILLIAMSON,
supra note 15, at 21 (describing“bounded rationality”); David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal
Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1947, 1979–80 (2012) (describing various cognitive biases).
21. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 26–30 (discussing employees’ opportunistic use
of asymmetrical information); Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions,
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26–30 (1999) (discussing principal–agent problems in the context of the
employee–inventor).
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. See infra Subsection II.C.1.
24. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 20, at 198 (discussing “bounded rationality,” which posits
that the capacity of the human mind is limited relative to the complex problems facing humans);
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 22–39 (discussing cognitive biases).
25. Posner, supra note 5, at 573.
26. F. M. S CHERER , INDUSTRIAL M ARKET S TRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC P ERFORMANCE 35
(2d ed. 1980); see also Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the
Competition-Innovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION P OL’Y & ECON. 159, 179 (2006),
available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0208.pdf.
27. CAVES, supra note 19, at 1; cf. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 78
(1982) (“Whereas allocative efficiency concerns overall placement of resources in the economy,
productive, or technical, efficiency refers to individual firms’ use of their resources in the most
effective manner.”).
28. CAVES, supra note 19, at 1; CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 2; Alison Green & David
Mayes, Technical Inefficiency in Manufacturing Industries, 101 ECON. J. 523, 524 (1991),
available at http://econpapers.repec.org/article/ecjeconjl/default1991.htm (“Technical inefficiency
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Perhaps because of this multiplicity of approaches to these issues in the
economic literature, patent scholars have largely ignored the ramifications
of these economic insights on the design of effective legal systems.30 In the
words of two prominent scholars, “[intellectual property], perhaps more
than any other substantive area of law, is grounded in the rational actor
model that undergirds classical economics.”31 Only a small group of patent
scholars have applied a broader economic perspective to patent law, and
these scholars have limited their analyses to specific contexts, such as the
effects of cognitive biases on inventors and judges.32 Patent law scholars
thus have not recognized that firms and individuals often do not maximize
their profits and that this overlooked economic insight contradicts
fundamental assumptions lying at the heart of current patent policy.
This Article begins to fill this void in the literature regarding the
economic effects of patent law. To start, this Article collects, unifies, and
is thus the failure to achieve maximum possible output from whatever combination of inputs have
been chosen.”).
29. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 194; LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 17 at 104–06; see also CAVES &
BARTON, supra note 19, at 2 (discussing X-inefficiency and technical inefficiency).
30. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 11 (asserting that there is “a tendency among
economic analysts of intellectual property to reduce the entire problem of intellectual property
rights to a tradeoff between ‘incentive[s]’ [to create] and ‘access’ [to those creations]”); Buccafusco
& Sprigman, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that “there has been relatively little discussion of [modern
economic theories’] implications for intellectual property (IP) law”). For a more detailed account of
the conventional economic view of patent scholars, see infra notes 51, 54, 60, and 65 and
accompanying text. In other areas of law, particularly in antitrust law, scholars have better engaged
modern economic perspectives. See, e.g., David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust
Law of Mergers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 798–99 (1989) (discussing productive inefficiency
in the context of antitrust law); Gerla, supra note 17, at 223–28 (discussing productive inefficiency
under the label “X-inefficiency” in the context of antitrust law); Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone
II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517,
1517–18 (2012) (arguing that considerations of behavioral economics should not affect antitrust
law and critiquing the behavioralist approach).
31. Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 3.
32. E.g., id. at 4 (arguing that the “endowment effect” may undermine the transfer of
intellectual property rights); Crouch, supra note 15, at 161 (arguing that “bounded rationality”
affects inventors’ decisions to seek patent protection); Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1248–50
(arguing that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues invalid patents in part because patent
examiners are boundedly rational); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 701 (1998), available at
http://www.cornellcollege.edu/dimensions/workshops/reading-group-resources/science-280.pdf
(asserting that the ‘“attribution bias”’ hinders patent licensing); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently NonObvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1411–20 (2006) (arguing that hindsight bias affects whether decision makers
find that patents are obvious in light of the prior art); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding PatentQuality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2155–56 (2009) (asserting that cognitive biases will
prompt inventors to seek patents that are not cost-justified). Broader applications of modern
economic analyses to patent law are exceedingly rare. See, e.g., Liza Vertinsky, An Organizational
Approach to the Design of Patent Law, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 211, 214 (2012) (applying the
insights of new institutional economics to patent policy).
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harmonizes much of the economic scholarship analyzing obstacles to profit
maximization, beginning by adopting the single term “productive
inefficiency” to describe any situation in which individuals or firms fail to
maximize their own profits. Building from the existing economic literature,
this Article argues that competition generally improves productive
efficiency. Using these economic insights, this Article argues that
traditional economic analyses of patent law fail to correctly assess the costs
and benefits stemming from patent protection because patent rights that
restrain competition can undermine profit maximization. As a result, firms
will not respond to financial inducements to invent in the ways predicted
by neoclassical economics.33 For instance, pharmaceutical firms may
tolerate outdated manufacturing technologies and processes because
powerful patents protect their products.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I begins by describing in more
detail the traditional neoclassical economic model and its use by patent
scholars. Part I establishes that patent scholars typically rely upon
neoclassical economics to identify and analyze the costs and benefits of
patent law in order to increase social welfare. Part II then synthesizes the
substantial economic literature rejecting the neoclassical assumption of
profit maximization and identifying numerous factors that limit the
productive efficiency of individuals and firms. Part II also details the harms
to society caused by productive inefficiencies and the economic
mechanisms to reduce those harms. In particular, Part II argues that
competition reduces productive inefficiencies. Part III applies this more
fulsome economic perspective to patent law in general, as well as to three
unresolved debates in patent law regarding the commercialization of
patented inventions, patent scope, and patent examination. Finally, the
Conclusion provides a brief summary of the main arguments in this
Article.
I. NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND PATENT LAW
Most legal scholars rely on traditional neoclassical economics to
analyze the effects of patent law, and thus, a clear understanding of this
model is required to appreciate the role that neoclassical economics plays
in patent law scholarship.
A. Neoclassical Economics
Neoclassical economics is founded on the assumption that individuals
and firms minimize costs and maximize profits.34 Economist Oliver
Williamson has described this assumption in more detail:

33. See infra Section I.A.
34. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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[I]t is assumed that the firm operates on its production
function, which shows the maximum output of product that
can be realized from each feasible combination of factor
inputs (mainly labor and capital). Failure to operate on the
production function would imply wasteful use of inputs; this
is assumed away.35
Importantly, this assumption generates one of the most important
conclusions of neoclassical economics: that competitive markets typically
maximize social welfare.36 To maximize profits, firms must compete with
their rivals, and this competition drives prices down. Lower prices allow
for more transactions to be completed and each successful transaction
benefits consumers.37 For example, when a consumer is willing to pay $10
to purchase a product but is able to purchase it at a market price of only $7,
the consumer enjoys a benefit of $3. Economists call such a benefit from
trade to a consumer a “consumer surplus.”38 Similarly, if the manufacturer
of the product is willing to sell it for $5, then the sale at a price of $7 also
creates a “producer surplus” of $2.39 Neoclassical economists argue that
competitive markets reach an equilibrium that maximizes social welfare
because competition drives prices down to a level that supports the
maximum number of socially beneficial transactions, thereby maximizing
the total consumer and producer surpluses.40
Although market transactions generate social wealth, neoclassical
economics recognizes that they may fail to take place in (at least) two
canonical situations. First, a monopolist may strategically decide to engage
in only certain transactions by raising prices (or as economists prefer to
phrase it, restrict output so that prices rise due to consumer demand).41
Some consumers will be unable to afford the higher price, and some
socially beneficial transactions therefore will not take place resulting in the
loss of some of the total surplus. Economists refer to this loss as

35. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 250.
36. See MANKIW, supra note 17, at 11.
37. Id. at 136–41 (discussing the economic principle of consumer surplus).
38. The consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the amount a consumer is
willing to pay for a good or service and the price that the consumer actually pays for it. Id. at 137.
39. Specifically, a producer surplus is the difference between the price that a producer
charges and the producer’s valuation of the good or service. Id. at 141. Because profit-maximizing
firms will not sell if their costs exceed their financial returns, neoclassical economics concludes that
each transaction generates a producer surplus.
40. Id. at 136, 145–46 (describing total surplus).
41. See MANKIW, supra note 17, at 212 (discussing the problems that transaction costs and
externalities have on reaching an efficient bargain); id. at 306–07 (discussing profit maximization
vis-à-vis monopolization).
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“deadweight loss” and this situation as “allocative inefficiency.”42
Although the monopolist also suffers from the deadweight losses by
sacrificing some of its producer surplus, the monopolist more than makes
up for these losses through higher prices paid by consumers who can still
afford the goods or services. Although profit maximization by the
monopolist can reduce social welfare,43 the monopolist’s desire to
maximize profits limits the harm to social welfare by preventing the
monopolist from raising prices to even higher levels. According to
neoclassical economic analysis, the monopolist will raise prices until its
marginal costs equal its marginal revenues but no further.44
A second scenario in which market transactions do not take place is
when transaction costs prevent producers and consumers from
consummating transactions.45 As economist Ronald Coase famously
argued, if transactions are costless to consummate, individuals will
voluntarily agree to exchanges that increase both individual and social
welfare.46 In reality, however, transaction costs are often substantial and
thus “prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in
which the pricing system worked without cost.”47 When transaction costs
are nontrivial, markets may fail to maximize social welfare.48
42. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 2–3; id. at 21 (“The costs of monopoly power are thus
relatively high prices for lower than desired output rates and a distortion in the mix of goods from
what consumers desire.”); MANKIW, supra note 17, at 178.
43. Another effect of monopolies is wasteful ‘“rent seeking”’—“[e]conomic rent is a return
over and above the cost of generating the return; it is pure profit, and so worth incurring costs to
obtain, even if the costs exceed the social benefit from the undertaking, as they often do.” LANDES
& POSNER, supra note 12, at 17. In competing to obtain a monopoly, firms may spend wastefully.
Id. at 16–18; see also Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1112 (2007) (noting that rent seeking often arises with efforts to capture
“government largesse”).
44. MANKIW, supra note 17, at 307 (positing that the “equality of marginal revenue and
marginal cost determines the profit-maximizing quantity” for both competitive firms and
monopolies).
45. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 16 (noting that if transaction costs are too high, “a
property right may prevent optimal adjustments to changing values”); see also MANKIW, supra note
17, at 212.
46. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6, 8 (1960); accord
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094 & n.12 (1972) (“Recently it has been argued
that on certain assumptions, usually termed the absence of transaction costs, Pareto optimality or
economic efficiency will occur regardless of the initial entitlement.”).
47. Coase, supra note 46, at 15.
48. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 46, at 1106–09 (“Often the cost of establishing the
value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the
entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not occur.” (emphasis added)).
Although not the focus of this Article, markets also do not maximize social welfare when
externalities prevent the price of a product from accurately reflecting the costs (or benefits)
stemming from the product. MANKIW, supra note 17, at 197–202. In such a situation, market forces
can promote the production of too much (or too little) of the product. Id. at 198–99. For example,
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B. Traditional Intellectual Property Scholarship
Patent scholars recognize that patent laws affect market transactions
and thus can harm society; scholars and policymakers therefore try to
design legal regimes that maximize the extent to which the benefits of
patent rights exceed the costs.49 Traditional economics provides a
framework for analyzing such benefits and costs and has become the
dominant lens through which legal scholars evaluate the merits of patent
law.50
Under this approach, the main benefit of patent rights is that they
provide financial incentives for inventors to discover, disclose, and
commercialize new inventions.51 Building on the neoclassical assumption
markets may produce an inefficiently large volume of a product when firms are not liable for the
environmental damage caused by manufacturing the product. In such a situation, the firms that
pollute are able to externalize some of the costs associated with a product. Forcing firms to
internalize those costs will raise firms’ marginal cost, thereby increasing both the market price for
the good and overall social welfare.
49. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1813, 1825 & n.29, 1826 (1984).
50. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 4 (“Today it is acknowledged that analysis and
evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within an economic framework
that seeks to align that law with the dictates of economic efficiency.”). Some scholars, however,
have offered less economically focused justifications for patents. Id. at 5 (“We are skeptical that the
noneconomic theories of intellectual property have much explanatory power or normative
significance . . . .”); see, e.g., William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 371–73
(2011) (arguing that patents promote social norms that foster invention).
51. A complete recitation of the scholarship regarding the use of patents as incentives to
discover, disclose, and commercialize inventions is impossible because the literature is enormous,
but examples include the following: MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 158 (2008) (describing the traditional view of patent law); DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 7 (2009) (“The idea behind the
patent system is simple: invention is a ‘public good’ because it is expensive to invent but cheap to
copy those inventions.”); F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 64–68 (6th ed. 2013);
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 127 (4th ed.
2007) (“Patent law provides a market-driven incentive to invest in innovation, by allowing the
inventor to appropriate the full economic rewards of her invention.”); Dan L. Burk, Patenting
Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1619–20 (1993);
Lee, supra note 13, at 930 (noting certain trade-offs maintain “incentive[s] to invent”); Clarisa
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 629 n.11 (2002) (collecting numerous citations to
“literature modeling intellectual property in terms of rents and product markets,” and stating that a
complete list of such citations “would be impossible here”); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357–58, 377 (2010) (describing the “reward” of exclusive patent
rights as a “dominant justificatory theor[y] of patent law” that “largely motivates current patent
doctrine”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 467, 470 (2008) (“[D]iscussions of patent law and policy have for the most part
remained rooted in the paradigm of commercial sale as motivation for invention, disclosure, and
dissemination of technical advances”); Vertinsky, supra note 32, at 221–26. Although not the focus
of the discussion of productive inefficiency in this Article, traditional scholars also recognize other
benefits of patent rights. For example, some legal scholars contend that patent law creates

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 5

2056

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

of profit maximization, legal scholars argue that an inventor will pursue
patent rights at a level that effectively balances the costs and benefits borne
by that individual in acquiring those rights.52 As a result, changes in the
value of patent rights such as a change in patent term will prompt inventors
and their employers to adjust their behavior.53
Scholars have also relied on traditional economics to identify and
analyze the costs stemming from exclusive patent rights and have divided
these costs into three related categories. First and most importantly, many
scholars focus their analyses on circumstances in which patent rights can
disrupt the consummation of socially beneficial transactions. For example,
patent scholars argue that exclusive patent rights can limit competition and
allow firms to charge supra-competitive prices for their goods and services
leading to allocative inefficiencies and deadweight losses.54 Facing higher
prices, some consumers will be unable to obtain goods or services that
would be affordable in a competitive market, and these foregone
transactions would have increased social welfare.55 The costs to consumers
from patent rights are sometimes substantial, such as when patents limit
access to life-saving medical technologies. For example, by one estimate,
information-related positive externalities. See Long, supra, at 628, 648 (arguing that patents provide
a signaling mechanism to sources of capital that a patent owner, typically a business, engages in
significant research and development). Similarly, others assert that patents provide information that
help to support pro-innovation social norms. Hubbard, supra note 50, at 390–403.
52. See, e.g., Long, supra note 51, at 630 (asserting that the conventional understanding of
patent law posits that “[r]ational inventors will calculate the [potentially patentable] technology’s
expected revenue stream ex ante and proceed accordingly”). On the other hand, the lure of valuable
patent rights may also encourage rent-seeking behavior. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058–60 (2005) (“[T]he prospect of intellectual
property rights encourages rent-seeking behavior that is socially wasteful.”).
53. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 21; see also Kaplow, supra note 49, at 1825–26
(noting the relationship between patent life and inventive activity).
54. Many scholars discuss the deadweight loss created by patents in consumer markets. See,
e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8 (noting that patents “raise[] the cost of products to
buyers” despite their incentive to inventors); Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (arguing that patents are
designed to create allocative inefficiencies); Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REV.
969, 975 (2007) (asserting that deadweight loss will occur when consumers cannot afford a patent
owner’s supra-competitive prices); Lee, supra note 13, at 929 (asserting that in consumer markets
patents “produce deadweight loss and may even facilitate monopolies that cause significant
allocative distortions” (footnote omitted)); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 996–1000 (1997) (noting that because of an
intellectual property right in a product, “fewer people will buy the [product] than if it were
distributed on a competitive basis”); Long, supra note 51, at 632 (stating that patents “redistribut[e]
consumer surplus to producers”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 871 (“[P]roprietary control of
technology tend[s] to cause ‘dead weight’ costs due to restrictions on use.”); David S. Olson,
Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject
Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 197 (2009) (same); Sichelman, supra note 51, at 358 & n.103
(same); Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1737, 1748–49 (2011) (same).
55. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
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pharmaceuticals cost five to ten times more when protected by patents.56
Scholars also contend that exclusive patent rights create allocative
inefficiencies and deadweight losses in technology markets because
granting one entity the exclusive right to a discovery can prevent future
innovators from building upon it.57 Innovation is often a cumulative,
evolutionary process and “some of the follow-on efforts of inventors could
result in something not simply slightly different but significantly better
than the patented technology.”58 In fact, because independent invention is
not a defense to patent infringement,59 patents can deter competitors from
investing in innovation in patent-rich fields.
The second type of traditional economic cost that patent scholars
frequently examine is the transaction cost related to the transfer of patent
rights.60 Indeed, the transfer of patent rights can actually prevent some of
56. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8. For more mundane consumer goods, however, the
allocative inefficiency stemming from reduced transactions with consumers is often relatively small.
F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 998–99 (1987).
57. Numerous scholars have examined the deadweight losses created by patents in technology
markets. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8 (asserting that patents “can not only
encourage innovation, they can also interfere with it”); Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (“[P]atents are
likely to generate . . . inefficient allocation of resources.”); Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1237–
38 (noting the detrimental impact of patents on the process of innovation); Lee, supra note 13, at
929–30 (stating that “many commentators have observed” that “patents also introduce dynamic
distortions that may dampen follow-on innovation”); Lemley, supra note 54, at 996–1000; Long,
supra note 51, at 632 (asserting that when inventions are patented “not enough information will be
used”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 869–70; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 358 & n.103
(stating that patents “can stifle follow-on invention”).
58. Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 869–70; see BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8 (“A
patent gives its owner a legal right . . . to stop independent inventors from continuing to use ideas
they developed themselves.”). At the same time, an over-abundance of patents can force competitors
to engage in defensive patenting. For example, one competitor might obtain patents solely to be
able to assert them in retaliation for patent claims by another competitor. Such patents can also be
used to facilitate cross-licensing. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS,
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 59–60 (2004) (describing the practice of cross-licensing between major
companies); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1505 (2001) (noting that “many companies obtain patents for reasons totally unrelated to litigation
or licensing,” including “patent[ing] broadly to ‘hedge their bets’ if they are uncertain which
patents are likely to have value ex post”).
59. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8.
60. A complete recitation of the scholarship discussing the transaction costs created by
patents would be impractical here, but examples include: BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 140
(arguing that “by the late 1990s litigation costs clearly exceeded the profits from patents outside the
chemical and pharmaceutical industries”); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 33 (“When there is
a gross disparity in the value that the only competitors for a good attach to it, transaction costs are
likely to be high as each competitor vies for the largest possible share of that value.”); Paul J.
Heald, Transaction Costs and Patent Reform, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 447,
447 (2007) (evaluating how various proposals for patent law reform impact transaction costs);
Lemley, supra note 58, at 1507 (discussing the costs of patent licensing and litigation); Merges &
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the allocative inefficiencies and deadweight losses mentioned above.61 For
instance, a patent owner may grant a license to a competitor to improve
upon a patented technology, thereby reducing the deadweight losses
produced by the patent in technology markets. However, such transactions
can be difficult to consummate, thereby preventing some parties from
obtaining rights to use a patented technology.62
The final type of cost that patent scholars typically focus on is the cost
of administering the patent system. This cost includes the public and
private costs of obtaining patents from the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office and the cost of enforcing patents through litigation.63 Indeed, some
commentators contend that the costs of enforcing patents exceed the
benefits in many sectors of the U.S. economy.64
Many legal scholars consider the trade-off between the incentive effect
of patents and these three types of costs to be the central challenge in
designing effective patent laws.65 These scholars therefore strive to
influence lawmakers to develop laws directed toward reducing these costs
Nelson, supra note 11, at 874–75; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 368–70 (discussing transaction
costs associated with patents).
61. Cf. Lemley, supra note 58, at 1507 (“The cost of licensing without going to court is also
dramatically lower than the cost of litigation.”); Long, supra note 51, at 635.
62. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. In fact, transaction costs for transferring
patent rights tend to be high “because by definition [intellectual property] has no unique physical
site.” See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 16; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 343–44 (noting that
patent rights can give rise to “high bargaining costs”).
63. See, e.g., Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1227 (listing the private and social costs
arising from invalid patents); Lemley, supra note 58, at 1507–09 (discussing the costs of patent
litigation and licensing). Scholars have also argued that patents will sometimes generate additional
costs. For example, patent rights may encourage researchers, particularly academics, to keep their
work secret before they file for patents. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 183–84 (1987).
64. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 140 (asserting that “by the late 1990s
litigation costs clearly exceeded the profits from patents outside the chemical and pharmaceutical
industries”).
65. A complete recitation of the scholarship addressing the balancing of incentives and
traditional economic costs related to patents is impossible, but examples include: LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 12, at 22 (“[Exclusive IP] rights reduce the demand for intellectual property by
inserting a wedge between price and marginal cost, creating deadweight loss that must be balanced
against the disincentive effects of denying the creator of such property a remedy against copiers.”);
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 7–8; Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1106; Michael Abramowicz
& John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 361–
62 (2008) (“After all, a central drawback of intellectual property rights is that they increase
deadweight loss, as higher prices mean that some who value goods over marginal cost nonetheless
will not purchase them.”); Burk, supra note 51, at 1618–19; Durham, supra note 54, at 975 (“Hence
a successful patent system is one in which the public benefit created by encouraging technological
advancement more than compensates for the price paid as a consequence of the patentee’s
monopoly.”); Lemley, supra note 52, at 1059 (“By definition . . . the intellectual property system
permits owners to raise price above marginal cost, creating deadweight losses by raising the price to
consumers.”); Sichelman, supra note 51, at 346, 358 (discussing deadweight loss).
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while maintaining robust incentives to innovate.66 This balance, however,
is premised on the belief that the traditional neoclassical economic
understanding of patent law comprehensively describes the benefits and
costs of patent protection.67 The next Part of this Article examines whether
this belief is warranted.
II. PRODUCTIVE INEFFICIENCY
The application of neoclassical economics to patent law is in many
respects useful, but can also be misleadingly incomplete. Neoclassical
economics assumes that “firms produce maximum output for given
inputs . . . and, therefore, they are cost minimizers.”68 While this
assumption greatly simplifies analyses, it does not always align with
reality. In fact, many modern economists contend that firms often fail to
maximize profits due to productive inefficiencies.
A. Sources of Productive Inefficiency
In assuming that firms maximize profits, neoclassical economists
ignored much of the internal workings of firms. In contrast, more recent
economists more closely examine the conditions that exist within firms and
argue that “only individuals think and act, and hence individuals are the
proper units of investigation.”69 In focusing on individuals rather than the
actors in the aggregate in firms, modern economists have identified
numerous interrelated reasons that individuals fail to maximize both their
own well-being and firm profits; four of these sources of productive
inefficiency are germane to patent law.70
66. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1106 (providing “a possible solution” to the suboptimal trade-off between incentivizing inventers and ensuring access to inventions); Burk, supra
note 51, at 1618–19 (“[T]he societal costs the patent system generates must not be allowed to
exceed the benefits of the intellectual goods it fosters.”). For instance, an invention may not be
patented if it “would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103
(2012). Scholars have justified this basic rule of patent law on the grounds that awarding exclusive
rights in such a situation would create a deadweight loss and allocative inefficiency. LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 12, at 21. The scope of protection afforded to patents is also critical to
optimizing the impact of patents on social welfare. This scope depends on numerous factors,
including the duration, subject matter limitations, the bases for invalidating patent rights, and the
remedies for infringement. See id. (discussing the limited duration of patents); Crouch, supra note
15, at 141–42 (noting that policy makers must calibrate rights granted by patent protections,
“making them strong enough to help induce innovation and development while limiting
monopolistic problems”). Issues of patent scope and productive inefficiency are discussed in
Section III.D.
67. See Vertinsky, supra note 32, at 221–26 (providing the common assumptions shared by
the “mainstream theories of patents”).
68. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 9.
69. Id. at 63; see also id. at 201 (arguing that productive inefficiency “is a type of inefficiency
that results from intrafirm (personal and interpersonal) activities rather than market activities”).
70. Other sources of productive inefficiency are not relevant to this Article because patent
rights impact them only indirectly. For example, attaining sufficient size to realize meaningful
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First, although neoclassical economics posits that humans are guided by
a singular, well-defined profit motive, many modern economists contend
that human action is the complex product of multiple, competing impulses
and modes of thought. For example, psychologists, behavioral economists,
and more recently some legal scholars contend that humans exhibit “two
kinds of thinking, one that is intuitive and automatic, and another that is
reflective and rational.”71 Reflective thought processes are largely consistent
with the traditional assumption of profit maximization. When thinking
reflectively, people carefully deduce answers and consider the merits of
different alternatives.72 As a result, the reflective approach to decisionmaking often encourages people to “adhere to standards, to strive for the
maximum, and to strive by being calculating and attentive to details.”73
This deliberative approach to making decisions, however, requires both
time and effort. Often, individuals opt instead to make decisions using
“automatic” approaches to reach decisions more quickly and with
comparatively less effort.74 Unfortunately, the speed and ease of automatic
decision-making often comes at a substantial cost: automatic decisions
more often produce incorrect conclusions.75 Automatic decisions are often
distorted by systematic biases—so-called “cognitive biases”—that prevent
individuals from reaching accurate conclusions.76 Cognitive psychologists
and behavioral economists have identified many types of cognitive biases
and demonstrated that their effects are widespread.77
For example, due to the “availability bias,” individuals miscalculate the
likelihood of an event occurring because individuals often approximate the
probability based on “how readily examples come to mind” rather than
statistical estimation.78 The availability of examples, however, is often
affected by factors unrelated to the frequency with which an event actually
economies of scale can increase the productive efficiency of firms. See Scherer, supra note 56, at
1002–03.
71. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 19.
72. Id. at 19–20 (noting that the “Reflective System is more deliberate and self-conscious”).
73. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 64; see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 20 (noting
that the reflective cognitive system is, inter alia, controlled, deductive, and rule-following). In this
limited respect, modern scholars agree with traditional economists regarding the behaviors of
individuals.
74. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 65, 75; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 19–22 (“The
Automatic System is rapid and is or feels instinctive, and it does not involve what we usually
associate with the word thinking.”).
75. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 21–22 (noting that cognitive mistakes are
often made because people rely too heavily on the automatic system).
76. Id. at 22–23.
77. See, e.g., FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 67–69 (discussing the cognitive biases known as
representativeness, availability, and anchoring); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 19–37
(discussing several types of cognitive biases); Jaros, supra note 20, at 1979–80 (noting the
cognitive errors resulting from various cognitive biases).
78. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 25.
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occurs. For instance, some events, like plane crashes and murders, are
particularly newsworthy and easy to remember. As a result, people often
incorrectly believe that air travel is less safe than traveling by car or that
homicide is more common than less publicized causes of death like
suicide.79 In actuality, air travel is over seventy times safer than travelling
by car for an equivalent distance and suicide is approximately twice as
common as murder.80
Another widely recognized cognitive bias is “loss aversion,” which
arises when individuals weigh more heavily the harm from losing
something than the gain from acquiring it.81 As a result of loss aversion, an
individual may choose not to relinquish a less valuable asset even to gain
something more valuable. Consequently, “[l]oss aversion helps produce
inertia, meaning a strong desire to stick with your current
holdings . . . . even when changes are very much in [the individual’s]
interests.”82 Loss aversion is further complicated by the so-called
“hyperbolic discounting” of future losses. Under traditional economics,
individuals discount future gains and losses at a constant rate.83 Empirical
studies indicate, however, that individuals discount future events at a much
higher rate and value present costs and benefits substantially more than
those in the future.84 As a result, individuals fail to delay gratification at the
rate predicted by traditional economics.85 Behavioral economists assert that
hyperbolic discounting helps to explain the existence of many problems
involving excessive short-term consumption, including smoking and
consumer debt.86
79. Id. at 25 (noting that risks familiar to human cognition, such as acts of terrorism and
homicide “will be seen as more serious than a risk that is less familiar”).
80. Bourree Lam, Suicide vs. Homicide by State, per 100,000, FREAKONOMICS, (Sept. 1, 2011,
9:29 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2011/09/01/suicide-vs-homicide-by-state-per-100000/;
Matthew Yglesias, Passenger Airplanes Are Amazingly Safe, SLATE, (July 6, 2013, 4:39 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/07/06/passenger_airplanes_are_amazingly_safe.html.
81. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 33–34.
82. Id. at 34. Other well-known cognitive biases include the anchoring bias, the
representativeness bias, the optimism bias, and the status quo bias. Id. at 23–24, 26–35. A full
account of cognitive biases is beyond the scope of this Article.
83. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1396 n.114 (2004); see also
Wright & Stone, supra note 30, at 1531. For example, neoclassical economics assumes that an
individual would determine the value of receiving $1,000 ten years in the future by determining the
amount of money that must be invested today in order to grow to $1,000 in ten years. If the interest
rate for the next ten years is 5%, the present value of $1,000 is $613.91.
84. Bar-Gill, supra note 83, at 1396 (“Th[e] systematic disparity between people’s short-term
and long-term discount rates has been consistently demonstrated both in the laboratory and in realworld settings.”); id. at 1396 n.115 (collecting sources demonstrating the systematic disparity
between short and long-term discount rates).
85. See Wright & Stone, supra note 30, at 1532.
86. Bar-Gill, supra note 83, at 1395–99; see Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Is
Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1293–94 (2001).
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At times, people are aware of the costs and benefits of reflective and
automatic decision-making and can choose between these approaches
intelligently.87 For example, individuals may embrace self-paternalistic
measures to prevent their automatic decision-making systems from
undermining careful, reflective decisions, such as when a person who is
dieting decides not to buy a tempting food rather than to buy it but eat less.
Cognitive biases, however, are difficult to resist, particularly “when
choices and their consequences are separated in time.”88 Ultimately,
individuals make many decisions without carefully choosing between
reflective and automatic approaches.89
A second reason that individuals fail to maximize firm profits is that
even when individuals intend to think rationally and carefully, they face
substantial cognitive limitations. As Nobel Prize winning economist
Herbert Simon observed more than fifty years ago, “[t]he capacity of the
human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for
objectively rational behavior in the real world . . . .”90 Many economists
thus posit that humans exhibit at most “bounded rationality.”91 One
important reason that humans are boundedly rational is that neurological
structures and processes in the human brain create “rate and storage limits
on the powers of individuals to receive, store, retrieve, and process
information without error.”92 Humans also face difficulties in translating
ideas into forms that can be effectively communicated to others.93 Thus,
the bounded rationality of humans most significantly affects decisionmaking in situations involving complexity and uncertainty. For example,
humans often have a poor intuitive grasp of statistics and probability, and
consequently fail to effectively distinguish between patterns and
randomness.94 Facing complexity and uncertainty, individuals therefore
87. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 44.
88. Id. at 73. For example, many people fail to stick to their New Years’ resolutions.
89. Similarly, when facing a decision with significant emotional ramifications, individuals
may make decisions based on those emotions and, once free from emotional strain, lament their
moments of weakness. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 206 (“Sometimes we are tired, sometimes we
are angry, jealous, afraid. We often . . . look back and regret the decisions we make.”).
90. SIMON, supra note 20, at 198 (emphasis omitted); see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at
21 (positing that human behavior, while intended to be rational, is only limitedly so).
91. SIMON, supra note 20, at 198; WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 21.
92. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 21.
93. Id. at 22.
94. See generally LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD’S WALK: HOW RANDOMNESS RULES
OUR LIVES (2008) (describing the inability of many people to understand statistics or to recognize
the effects of randomness); SCHERER, supra note 26, at 29–30 (noting that some economists argue
that “many business people are poorly informed about business conditions in general, know almost
nothing about the concept of probability, and understand only crudely the logic of profit
maximization, i.e., what variables must be taken into account, such as marginal cost and marginal
revenue, and how they must be related to maximize profits”); Crouch, supra note 15, at 161 (noting
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employ simplifying strategies and heuristics.95 In doing so, however,
“‘approximation must replace exactness in reaching a decision.’”96 While
often useful, “heuristics can also lead to serious errors in judgment.”97
When complexity and uncertainty force employees to use heuristics, errors
are often inevitable and firms will accordingly fail to maximize profits.
A third reason that individuals may prevent firms from maximizing
profits stems from the individuals’ reliance on habits to determine their
behavior.98 For instance, an employee may continue to utilize an approach
to her job even after changes in the market or new technologies create
opportunities for improvement. Of course, habits are not inherently
inefficient. Habituated behavior may allow individuals to work more
quickly and some habits can increase employee productivity, like doublechecking the accuracy of work. Maintaining less effective habits may also
be justified when the cost of developing new, better habits requires a
substantial investment of time and energy.99 For example, even if a new
technology can theoretically increase firm profits, the costs of changing
old, technologically outdated habits may exceed the benefits.100
Despite the potential benefits of habituated behaviors, it is unlikely that
employees always use habits in a cost-justified manner. In many cases,
people decide to maintain habits using the automatic mode of decisionmaking described above101 without effectively weighing the costs and
benefits of that decision.102 Cognitive biases also limit the capacities of
individuals to effectively rely on habits. For example, psychological
studies demonstrate that individuals often exhibit a strong cognitive bias in
favor of preserving the status quo, causing well-established bad habits to

that the “lottery effect” affects potential innovators, “causing them to exhibit the skewed preferences
of the patent lottery and thus be willing to invest against the actuarial norm”).
95. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 37 (arguing that people adopt sensible “rules
of thumb” to cope with questions in a complex world).
96. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 23 (quoting Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded
Rationality, in 12 DECISION AND ORGANIZATION 170 (C. McGuire & R. Radner eds., 1972)).
97. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 67.
98. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 74–78; CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 132 (“A
complex organization develops a set of routines that draw on decentralized knowledge and suffice
as responses to the range of disturbances that ordinarily intrude.”).
99. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 121 (noting that employees may continue an activity
because of the “sunk costs” invested in that activity).
100. See also id. (“The sunk costs in programs and facilities of ongoing projects thus insulate
existing programs from displacement by alternatives which, were the current program not already in
place, might otherwise be preferred.”).
101. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 43 (“In many situations, people put themselves
into ‘automatic pilot’ mode, in which they are not actively paying attention to the task at hand. (The
Automatic System is very comfortable that way.)”); see also id. (providing examples of resorting to
routine or habit while operating under the automatic state of cognition).
102. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at xvii, 79.
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persist.103 Further, it is often difficult for individuals to determine that a
once-good habit has become ineffective due to changes in technological or
market conditions, in part because humans often become desensitized to
environmental stimuli and will not perceive environmental changes unless
they exceed a sufficient magnitude.104 A final reason that employees will
not maximize firm profits is that employees often pursue goals at work that
conflict with the profit related objectives of the firm, such as on-the-job
leisure, personal relationships, perquisites, power, and prestige.105 One
important individual goal that frequently undercuts firm profits is an
individual’s desire to conserve his or her own efforts.106 Such efforts in
conservation may cause an individual to embrace automatic and intuitive
decision-making processes when more conscientious decision-making
would better serve the firm. Employees may also deliberately limit their
efforts by shirking their responsibilities.107 Although shirking reduces firm
profits, an employee enjoys the full benefit of reduced effort but only a
portion of the cost because the losses from shirking are typically spread
across the entire firm.108 Even diligent employees may not maximize firm
profits if they strive to maximize value on a timetable that is shorter than
103. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 34.
104. See id. at 34–35 (discussing status quo bias); FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 77–78.
105. See, e.g., CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 5, 65 (noting that the coalition of workers
that comprises firms may falter ex post “through shirking other opportunistic behavior by some
members of the coalition”); FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 38, 188 (describing trade-offs between
employees’ on-the-job leisure and profits); LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 27 (explaining ways
agents of firms will make decisions in their own interest); WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 119
(discussing how internal social relations of a firm can undermine the profit-related goals of the firm
in the procurement context); Merges, supra note 21, at 26 (noting that “employees will maximize
their own utility, rather than their employer’s”); Posner, supra note 5, at 574–75 (describing reasons
why a manager of a monopoly might divert firm resources to redecorating the corner office).
106. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 55 (asserting that “workers have effort discretion which makes
their performance dependent upon motivation”). Employment contracts generally give employees
some discretion over the amount of effort to apply to their jobs. See id. at 74 (providing that firms
“buy labor time,” yet human effort “is not directly purchased”). Indeed, at the time of hiring,
employers are often unable to describe in detail the specific tasks employees must perform, and
instead must describe job responsibilities in broader, discretion-laden terms. See WILLIAMSON,
supra note 15, at 124 (noting that “the joining of bounded rationality with uncertainty makes
contractual completeness expensive (if not infeasible) to attain”); cf. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 127–28 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing legal indeterminacy). Moreover, firms are often unable to
determine ex ante the output that an employee should produce based on given inputs. FRANTZ,
supra note 17, at 55.
107. See CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 65 (noting the limits of employment contracts
given shirking and opportunistic behavior).
108. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 90; Merges, supra note 21, at 22 & n.72 (discussing
shirking). Conversely, an exceptionally diligent employee bears the entire cost of such industrious
behavior but likely enjoys only a portion of any increased firm profits. The incentive structure
facing employees and managers thus can be understood as a prisoner’s dilemma. When each
individual adopts a rational maximization strategy, the result is an inferior outcome for all
individuals. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 90–93.
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the firm’s.109 For example, an employee may strive to maximize quarterly
profits to please shareholders when the firm’s profits ultimately would be
increased in the long-term by a strategy involving short-term losses.110 This
view of employee motivation conflicts with traditional economic accounts:
“In conventional [neoclassical economics] all economic activity takes
place between principals, or, to the extent that agents exist, they are
presumed to act entirely in accord with the interests of the principals.”111
When employees pursue non-profit goals, firm profits suffer.112
B. Effects of Productive Inefficiency
As described above, well-functioning markets generally enhance social
welfare because voluntary transactions generate wealth in the form of
consumer and producer surpluses.113 As a result, conditions that cause
parties to consummate fewer transactions reduce the total welfare of
society.114 For example, as recognized by traditional neoclassical
economics, monopoly prices harm society because some consumers will be
unable to afford them.115
Although ignored by neoclassical economics, productive inefficiencies
produce a similar reduction in social welfare. When firms suffer from
productive inefficiencies, employees are less effective in turning inputs
into outputs, and firms consequently face higher costs in producing goods
and services. Such firms therefore produce smaller quantities and charge
higher prices that some consumers cannot afford.116 As a result, when
productive inefficiencies affect a large part of a market, they create a
deadweight loss, which reduces social welfare.117 Importantly, the losses to
109. Hyperbolic discounting exacerbates this problem. See supra notes 83–86 and
accompanying text (discussing hyperbolic discounting).
110. See SCHERER, supra note 26, at 30 (theorizing that a monopolistic firm may not choose to
exploit its monopoly power in order to build customer loyalty at expense of short term profits).
111. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 26–27.
112. Profit-sharing schemes can help to align the incentives of employees and their superiors,
but “[e]ven the best-designed employee bonus and profit-sharing systems seldom succeed in
instilling much zeal for profit maximization below the middle management level.” SCHERER, supra
note 26, at 31.
113. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
114. See MANKIW, supra note 17, at 159 (noting that taxation creates a disincentive for buyers
to consume and sellers to produce, which then diminishes market size to a suboptimal level).
115. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
116. See Posner, supra note 5, at 577 (“[M]oney expended to hire more of the factors of
production than actually needed to conduct a business diverts resources from more productive
activities, and this effect is not only additive to, but could be many times greater than, the social
cost in allocative inefficiency.”).
117. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. However, not all increased costs that firms
face due to productive inefficiencies reduce social welfare because the firm’s loss is sometimes an
employee’s gain. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 188 (explaining that employee leisure may
represent a nontraded commodity enjoyed as utility by employees as firm “output”); Posner, supra
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society stemming from productive inefficiencies are not merely theoretical,
as numerous empirical studies have identified significant economic losses
due to productive inefficiencies.118 One study estimates that losses due to
productive inefficiencies are equal to as much as 20% of the U.S.
economy.119 Additional empirical evidence regarding productive
efficiencies is discussed below.120
C. Reducing Productive Inefficiency
1. Competition
An important insight of the economic literature regarding productive
inefficiency is that competition can substantially reduce the social harms of
productive inefficiency.121 Robust competition reduces productive
inefficiency in at least three interrelated ways.122 First, competition
note 5, at 575 (describing the benefit of “[m]anagerial self-indulgence” in the context of monopoly
firms). For instance, when an employee shirks his responsibilities in order to take an extra break, the
employee receives the benefit of on-the-job leisure time. It is unlikely, however, that employees
value such “nontraded” commodities like on-the-job leisure time at a sufficiently high rate to
completely offset the harm to firm profits. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 191–93.
118. See, e.g., FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 136 (providing examples of economic losses due to
productive inefficiencies); THOMAS J. HOLMES & JAMES A. SCHMITZ, JR., FED. RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS, COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVITY: A REVIEW OF EVIDENCE 3 (2010) (reviewing
numerous empirical studies and concluding that they demonstrate that “increased competition raised
industry productivity”), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr439.pdf; Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition
over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 598 (2002) (reviewing empirical studies confirming
that “monopolies tend to produce less efficiently than players in a competitive market”); Gerla,
supra note 17, at 224 (noting that empirical studies demonstrate that production inefficiency,
otherwise known as “X-inefficiency,” indeed exists, and that firms suffer from production
inefficiencies that are often severe); Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency,”
56 AM. ECON. REV. 392, 406 (1966) (“The main burden of these findings is that [productive
inefficiency] exists, and that improvement in [productive efficiency] is a significant source of
increased output.”).
119. Gerla, supra note 17, at 227. In contrast, some estimates of losses from allocative
efficiency are small. For example, one economist has “estimated that the welfare loss due to
monopoly power was approximately one-tenth of one percent of the U.S. gross national product.”
FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 2; accord Leibenstein, supra note 118, at 392 (noting that empirical
studies suggest that “the problem of allocative efficiency is trivial”). But see BOLDRIN & LEVINE,
supra note 51, at 69 (“Although the current tendency in economics is to argue that the welfare
triangle is not large, in the case of innovation this is not always true.”).
120. See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
121. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 57 (arguing that competition can lead individuals to feel
driven to realize potential); id. at 98; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 48 (noting that
“markets provide self-control services”).
122. Lack of competition is not the only source of productive inefficiency. See CAVES, supra
note 19, at 11–17 (discussing numerous sources of productive inefficiency); CAVES & BARTON,
supra note 19, at 72–85 (describing various technical inefficiencies); Alison Green & David Mayes,
Technical Inefficiency in Manufacturing Industries, 101 ECON. J. 523, 523 (1991) (discussing
empirical studies regarding inefficiency across industries in the United Kingdom). Indeed, even in
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eliminates productively inefficient firms from the market.123 Firms and
business units within firms often vary in the nature and extent of their
productive inefficiencies.124 For instance, the effects of cognitive biases on
an employee are often affected by the “choice architecture” in which the
employee makes decisions, including the default rules that apply in the
absence of a decision, whether processes are designed to account for
employee errors, and the mechanisms for providing feedback to employees
after a decision has been made.125 Through competition, businesses with
better choice architecture will push from the market rivals who suffer more
from egregious cognitive biases.126 Similarly, firms likely differ in the
extent to which employees can pursue goals that undermine employer
profits. For example, some firms may offer generous perquisites like
company cars and richly appointed or architecturally ambitious offices.127
Competition may eliminate from the market—or at least reduce the market
share of—these productively inefficient firms.128 Differerences in the
competitive industries, employees sometimes may choose to pursue their own objectives rather than
tirelessly strive to maximize profits for their employers. A well-known example of this problem
arises every year on “Cyber Monday,” when millions of employees shop online from their places of
employment on the Monday after Thanksgiving. According to one study, 86% of employees
planned to shop while at work on Cyber Monday in 2013, leading to an estimated productivity loss
for employers valued at $2.5 billion. RetailMeNot Shoppers Trend Report: One in Four Consumers
Plan to Spend at Least Half of Their Workday Shopping Online on Cyber Monday, RETAILMENOT
(Nov. 25, 2013), http://retailmenot.mediaroom.com/2013-11-25-RetailMeNot-Shoppers-TrendReport-One-in-Four-Consumers-Plan-to-Spend-at-Least-Half-of-Their-Workday-Shopping-Onlineon-Cyber-Monday.
123. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 96 (“X-efficiency cannot continue unabated. Pressure
mounts as costs increase and profits decrease, and/or the threat imposed by new competition creates
a serious threat to jobs and incomes.”); HOLMES & SCHMITZ, supra note 118, at 7 (discussing the
reallocation of market share from lower productivity enterprises to higher productivity enterprises).
124. See CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 68 (“In seeking productivity improvements and
reacting to economic changes, the individual[] firms and plants in an industry continually perform
experiments.”). Empirical productivity studies are consistent with this variability. For example, a
study of 102 U.S. manufacturing industries found that the productivity in the top quartile of plants
was at least 25% higher than the average for that industry. Id. at 2. Typically, the top quartile of
plants was 65% more productive than the industry average. Id.
125. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 83–100 (explaining the six
principles of “choice architecture”).
126. See id. at 252 (“Choice architecture, both good and bad, is pervasive and unavoidable,
and it greatly affects our decisions.”).
127. One example of this type of productive inefficiency may be lavish corporate facilities. For
example, Apple, Inc. has announced plans to create a futuristic new corporate campus at a cost of
approximately $5 billion. Peter Burrows, Inside Apple’s Plans for Its Futuristic, $5 Billion
Headquarters, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-04-04/apples-campus-2-shapes-up-as-an-investorrelations-nightmare.
128. See CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 68 (“External competition limits this
opportunism because the presence of efficient rivals (or the threat of their entry) constrains the
amount of slack a firm’s participants can absorb . . . .”); SCHERER, supra note 26, at 38 (“No matter
how strongly managers prefer to pursue other objectives, and no matter how difficult it is to find
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internal hierarchical structure and organizational schemes of some firms
may facilitate supervision by management and reduce productive
inefficiencies of employees.129 Through competition, those firms with
more effective internal structures will predominate.
Second, competition reduces productive inefficiency by increasing the
information exchange between rivals.130 For example, the success of
competitors may help a firm to identify circumstances in which its
employees are underperforming, perhaps because employees are pursuing
personal goals that undermine firm profits. As employees move between
firms, superior organizational structures and choice architectures may also
be shared.131 Furthermore, success or failure in competing with rivals may
provide employees with information regarding the consequences of their
decisions, and such feedback can help employees to address poor decisionmaking stemming from cognitive biases and bounded rationality.132
Competitive threats can also reveal the inefficacy of old habits and the
costs of decisional inertia, prompting employees to be more alert and costconscious.133 “Wherever competition is absent, there is a disposition to rest
content with old methods, not to say slack ones.”134
profit-maximizing strategies in a world of uncertainty and high information costs, failure to satisfy
this criterion means ultimately that a firm will disappear from the economic scene.”); Posner, supra
note 5, at 575 (“A management not forced to reduce costs to the bone in order to survive is free to
take a more strategic attitude toward corporate and personal destiny than one constrained by the
market to pursue cost minimization and immediate profit maximization.”).
129. For example, large peer groups may be particularly subject to collective action problems
and may also face increased costs in distributing information to their members. MANCUR OLSON,
JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53–65 (1965)
(discussing the increased effectiveness of small groups of people); see also WILLIAMSON, supra note
15, at 45–47 (discussing various constraints on peer groups). Hierarchy can ameliorate some of
these concerns. Id. at 47.
130. See CAVES, supra note 19, at 9 (“[W]hen the number of market participants is small, there
are fewer agents to experiment and try for improved ways of doing things, and fewer peers from
whom to learn.”); CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 68–69 (arguing that competitors increase
technical efficiency by engaging in diffusion of information); SCHERER, supra note 26, at 38
(“[K]nowledge that only the fit will survive provides a potent incentive for all firms to adapt their
behavior in profit-maximizing directions, learning whatever skills they need and emulating
organizations that succeed in the survival game.”); Posner, supra note 5, at 574 (“Under
competition, a firm either learns from its most efficient rival or goes under; either way production
ends up at the least-cost level.”).
131. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing choice architecture).
132. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 75 (“Learning is most likely if people get
immediate, clear feedback after each try.”).
133. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 96.
134. Arthur Twining Hadley, The Good and Evil of Industrial Combination, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1897, at 383. Judge Learned Hand made a similar and more detailed observation
more than sixty years ago: “Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power
deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is
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Third, competition can reduce productive inefficiencies by deterring
employees from pursuing individual goals that undermine firm profits.
When individual contributions do not significantly affect the firm’s
success, an employee may be inclined to engage in selfish behavior.135
Facing competition, however, an employee’s selfish behavior may impact
the firm more significantly, and the cost to the employee from a wage
reduction or loss of employment may outweigh the benefits to the employee
from opportunistic behavior.136 Similarly, facing robust competition and the
resulting threat to the firm’s survival, managers may be less reluctant to engage
in the critical supervision necessary to increase productivity even if such
supervision strains interpersonal relationships, requires additional effort, and
exposes managers to greater scrutiny by higher level management.137 When
competition threatens the firm, employees may also be more receptive to
managerial supervision even if those employees do not otherwise enjoy the
changes wrought by management.138 Therefore, “competition reduces the
opportunity to engage in the various forms of discretionary behavior
available to (some) employees of the monopolist, including behaving in an
arbitrary sloppy, bureaucratic, arrogant, and nonresponsive fashion.”139

necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.” United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
135. See OLSON, supra note 129, at 62 (arguing that individuals in large, latent groups will
likely not be influenced by social incentives to obtain the common good).
136. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 242–43 (noting that without competition “the management
and workers in the firm [may] take part of their rewards as on-the-job leisure”). In a sense,
competition causes employees to internalize part of the cost of the productive inefficiency that the
employee imposes on the firm. Competition among employees may reduce opportunistic behavior
as one employee’s diligence reveals the opportunism of another. Id. at 27 (“[R]ivalry among large
numbers of bidders will render opportunistic inclinations ineffectual. Parties who attempt to secure
gains by strategic posturing will find . . . that such behavior is nonviable.”). However, social
interactions among employees may reduce this form of competition. Peer pressure can encourage
harder working employees to reduce their efforts because one individual can “make others look bad
by working too hard.” FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 87; see also LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 17, at 33
(noting that peers “are likely to impose themselves on the more energetic workers in the firm, to
reduce their norms towards somewhat lower levels and to increase the levels for especially
unenergetic individuals”).
137. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 59 (arguing that individuals within organizations will be
more likely to forego greater effort where competition is light and forego leisure when competition
is high); Gilbert, supra note 26, at 205 (suggesting that competition may make firms attune to
inefficient outputs by employees). As Adam Smith observed more than two centuries ago,
“[m]onopoly . . . is a great enemy to good management.” ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 147
(Random House, 1937).
138. See, e.g., FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 102 (noting a change in attitude among employees
whose plant faced shutdown); id. at 59 (“[I]n situations where competitive pressures are high, and
hence the costs of [trading disutility of greater effort for leisure] are also high, they will exchange
less of the disutility of effort for the utility of freedom from pressure . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); HOLMES & SCHMITZ, supra note 118, at 17–21 (providing examples of employees and
employee-unions accepting management-directed change in the face of increasing competition in
the iron ore manufacturing industry).
139. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 98.
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Empirical studies confirm that heightened competition can reduce
productive inefficiencies, thereby increasing the productivity of firms.140
Studies of early shipping industries, the U.S. iron industry, and the U.S.
cement industry have found that increased competition led to significant
productivity improvements as employees became more receptive to
managerial supervision that granted the employees less on-the-job leisure
time.141 Other empirical studies have reported that competition increased
productivity by encouraging investment in new technologies and by
eliminating low-productivity firms from the market.142 Similarly, empirical
studies of trade liberalization have found that reductions in tariffs often
increase the productivity of domestic firms.143 Most significantly, broadbased studies of productive efficiency in many different countries have
confirmed that a lack of competition often exacerbates productive
inefficiencies.144
Increased competition thus can improve productive efficiency and
increase social welfare. Nevertheless, firms are often reluctant to support
policies that would intensify competition. Although intensified competition
may make a firm more productively efficient, that same competition could
reduce the firm’s profits if the firm loses market share due to increased
competition.145 Similarly, competition may undermine the job security or
compensation of individual employees. For instance, employees who enjoy
substantial on-the-job leisure and perquisites may not want to lose those
benefits to increased competition. Even firms that do not lose market share
may be reluctant to embrace greater competition if it leads to reduced
prices and thus lower firm profits.146 As a result, some employees and
firms may seek to improve productive inefficiency through a different
mechanism: managerial supervision.
140. Scherer, supra note 56, at 1004 & n.16.
141. HOLMES & SCHMITZ, supra note 118, at 14–22, 25–26.
142. Id. at 23, 27–28.
143. Id. at 29–33.
144. CAVES, supra note 19, at 11–12 (discussing effects of external and domestic competition).
But see Dayna B. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally: Antitrust Law and Hospital Mergers, 31
HOUS. L. REV. 813, 830–32 (1994) (asserting that the prevalence of productive inefficiencies in the
context of monopolies is “based more upon intuition than empirical evidence”). Empirical studies
also indicate that competition promotes competitiveness in global markets. See MICHAEL E. PORTER,
THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 117 (1990) (“In global competition, successful firms
compete vigorously at home and pressure each other to improve and innovate.”). Some empirical
studies indicate that increases in competition can reduce firm productivity when increased market
concentration is required to achieve greater economies of scale. CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at
69; FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 167–68. Firm productivity, however, is distinct from productive
inefficiency, and some empirical studies of productive inefficiency therefore try to control for
considerations of scale. CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 67.
145. For example, if competitors enjoy greater gains in productive efficiency a less
productively efficient firm may be weeded out of the market.
146. In such a situation, the consumer surplus would increase. See supra notes 40–44 and
accompanying text.
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2. Limits on Managerial Supervision
Undoubtedly, managers can encourage employees to work more
effectively through supervision, threats of termination, and financial
inducements.147 However, the capacity of management to reduce
productive inefficiency is often limited because productive inefficiencies
affect managers as well as employees. Managers often suffer from
cognitive biases and bounded rationality, rely on outdated habits and
technologies, and pursue nonprofit objectives like power, prestige, and onthe-job leisure.148
Indeed, managers may face additional challenges in gathering accurate
information regarding the activities of their subordinates. Managers are
often unable to determine ex ante the output that an employee should
produce based on given inputs,149 and when managers supervise numerous
employees who all perform complex tasks, problems of bounded
rationality are particularly likely to hamper efforts to gather information
regarding the performance of those subordinates.150 Moreover, employees
often strive to conceal their mistakes and opportunistic behavior from their
managers.151 Furthermore, when managers rely on inaccurate information,
subordinates may be reluctant to disagree and provide more accurate
information due to concerns that the manager will react negatively to the
correction.152 Even when a manager knows that an employee is shirking,
the manager may pursue the nonpecuniary goal of harmonious
interpersonal relationships by avoiding the conflict-laden task of
reprimanding the subordinate.153
147. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 84 (assuming that “vertical relations” exert pressure for
effort and that employees receive satisfaction from approval from supervisors); LEIBENSTEIN, supra
note 17, at 29 (“The main reason for emphasizing the contrast between effort positions and effort
points is the nature of the signals received by an employee . . . indicating varying demands for
effort. When heeded, such signals, as usually interpreted, trigger what the individual believes to be
the appropriate effort response or one that he likes to give.”); WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 54
(discussing the effects of employment hierarchy).
148. See supra Section II.A; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 126–27 (noting that
managers suffer from bounded rationality).
149. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 55 (“[Managers] do[] not always know in advance the quantity
of output which will be received from given inputs and input ratios.”).
150. “Bounded rationality gives rise to finite spans of control together with the specialization
of communication and decision-making functions.” WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 126 (footnote
omitted). As a result, as firms grow in size, a “control loss phenomenon” arises. Id.(internal
quotation marks omitted); accord SCHERER, supra note 26, at 31 (“The more hierarchical filters
through which information passes, the more distorted the information is likely to become . . . .”).
151. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 9, 26, 122. Even mid-level managers may “conceal or
gloss over operating problems until the situation has deteriorated beyond repair.” SCHERER, supra
note 26, at 31.
152. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 122 (noting that subordinates “may tell their supervisor
what he wants to hear; assertively, they will report those things they want him to know”).
153. See SCHERER, supra note 26, at 31–32. Furthermore, managerial oversight may produce
counterproductive results because close supervision can undermine employee motivation due to the
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In light of these manifold challenges in supervising employees,
managers may evaluate employee performance by focusing on aspects of a
job that are more amendable to quantification but do not fully reflect an
employee’s contribution to the employer’s commercial success.154 For
example, a managing partner in a law firm may focus on the number of
hours that a young associate attorney bills rather than the quality of the
associate’s work during those hours. Such an approach to supervision
encourages employees like the associate attorney to focus on the measured
aspect of their responsibilities to the detriment of other aspects of their jobs
that are important to firm profits but more difficult to quantify.155 Indeed,
social scientists have demonstrated that merely measuring a behavior can
affect its frequency.156 One particularly problematic aspect of this
phenomenon arises when failure is easier to measure than success.157 An
employee in such a situation will discount the benefits of success and
overreact to the costs of failure.158 Consequently, the employee may
become excessively risk averse and avoid taking otherwise cost-justified
risks.159 Similarly, employees who encounter failure due to factors beyond
“dissatisfaction of not being one’s own master.” FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 86, 99; see WILLIAMSON,
supra note 15, at 55 (noting that hierarchies may be disruptive because “transparent inequality of
rank [is] considered objectionable by some individuals” and “auditing and experience-rating may
offend their sense of individual and collective well-being”); Merges, supra note 21, at 28 (noting
that managerial scrutiny of researchers can be “counterproductive”). Some managers may be more
successful in navigating these difficulties than others, but identifying and promoting such highquality managers can be difficult due to productive inefficiencies at higher levels of management.
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 52, 230 (“Many managers are involved, but the exceptional ones
can be discerned only with difficulty.”); see also id. at 24 (“If the specialization of labor is feasible,
those whose rationality limits are less severely constrained than others are natural candidates to
assume technical, administrative, or political leadership positions—which is to say that a hierarchy
can emerge on this account.”).
154. See Merges, supra note 21, at 3 (“[P]rincipal-agent theory . . . demonstrates that when
employees are assigned to multiple tasks . . . managers must take care lest employee compensation
be tied too closely to one measurable task.”).
155. See id. at 29 (stating that if one of the multiple tasks assigned by management “pays better
than the others, that task will get an inordinate amount of the employees’ attention” and that this
dynamic can have a “detrimental effect on teamwork”).
156. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 70 (discussing the “mere-measurement effect”).
For example, merely asking people whether they intend to floss will increase the likelihood that
those people will in fact floss their teeth. Id.
157. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 121 (positing that “it may be impossible . . . to easily
distinguish between faulty and meritorious internal performance”).
158. The loss-aversion bias further exacerbates this tendency. See supra notes 81–82 and
accompanying text. Other cognitive biases, however, may temper this effect. See THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 31–32 (describing the “optimism bias” under which individuals are
“unrealistically optimistic”).
159. One way to mitigate these types of problems is to uncouple compensation from
performance. For example, “corporate R&D personnel generally receive their salary whether or not
a particular line of research pans out. They do not give back their salary when an experiment goes
awry or a product design proves unworkable.” Merges, supra note 21, at 31. On the other hand,
when compensation is not tied to performance, shirking is more likely to occur.
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their control may “press for program extensions beyond objectively
rational cut-off limits in the hopes that the environment will change and
‘save’ their reputations.”160
III. PRODUCTIVE INEFFICIENCY AND PATENTS
Although modern economic models consider the sources and effects of
productive inefficiency, legal scholars and lawmakers have failed to apply
these advances in economics to patent law. As a result, expanding the
analysis of the economic apects of patent law to include considerations of
productive inefficiency provides new insight into the development of
effective patent law.
A. General Concerns
Due to the limitations of managerial supervision, competition is vital to
limiting productive inefficiencies. Unfortunately, patents often inhibit
competition.161 For instance, patents may provide exclusive rights to
technology that is critical to competing in an industry, like the active
ingredients in some pharmaceuticals.162 Patents can also limit competition
when they cover technology that is incorporated into an industry
standard.163 After a certain technology becomes part of an industry
160. WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 121.
161. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8 (“[P]atents represent a significant
departure from the norm of market competition. A patent gives its owner a legal right not only to
prevent others from copying her idea but even the right to stop independent inventors from
continuing to use ideas they developed themselves.”). Often times, patents have little effect on
competition. Indeed, many patents have little economic effect because they are never licensed or
otherwise commercialized. See infra Subsection III.C.1. Other times, patents provide only shortlived protection from competition because competitors can develop non-infringing market
substitutes. See Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (“Unlike the true monopolist, patent holders may well
face a marketplace containing a variety of substitutes for their product, and be forced to price their
products competitively.”); Gilbert, supra note 26, at 163 (“Patent protection does not guarantee that
the inventor will be able to prevent competition from others, either legally by inventing-around the
new technology, or illegally by infringing the patent.”). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recently
held that “a patent does not necessarily confer market power” for antitrust purposes. Ill. Tool Works
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44 (2006).
162. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, at xv (2012) (describing the modern view of
patents as property that set “boundary-based” restrictions on use); Burk, supra note 51, at 1618
(noting that, in some instances, patents may confer a virtual monopoly on holders, which monopoly
generates inefficiencies common to monopolies). The market power created by patents may be
higher in areas of rapid technological change. See Raymond Hartman et al., Assessing Market
Power in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change, 2 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 317, 319 (1993).
163. Industry standards cover a wide variety of products, including mobile phones,
semiconductors, and personal computers. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and
Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1893, 1903, 1946 (2002). These patents are
often described as “‘standards-essential’ patents” or “SEPs.” Jorge L. Contreras, Standards,
Patents, and the National Smart Grid, 32 PACE L. REV. 641, 655 (2012). By definition, firms in a
standards-based industry cannot avoid infringing SEPs. Because of the competitive problems that
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standard, competitors must use the patented technology even though
alternate technologies were available before the establishment of the
industry standard.164 Even patents on technologies that are not central to an
industry and thus protect only one way of competing can affect rivalry by
raising costs for competitors who accidentally infringe these patents.165 For
example, one firm may invest substantial resources in developing a
technology only to learn later that the technology infringes a rival’s patent.
Because independent invention is not a defense to patent infringement,166
the infringing firm may consider switching to a different technology to
avoid patent liability. “Even when non-infringing alternatives are
technologically possible, however, switching technologies” may be
commercially infeasible.167 Moreover, even if there are many potential
substitutes for patented technology on the market, the first company to
reach the market may enjoy a dominant position due to first mover effects.
For example, although some drugs use similar active ingredients, the first
one to reach the market may dominate for many years.168
As described earlier, competition is often critical to limiting productive
inefficiencies.169 As a result, when patents limit competition, they promote
productive inefficiencies and thus reduce social welfare.170 Therefore,
policy makers should consider the effects of patents on productive
can arise with industry standards, many standard-setting organizations seek to use private
agreements to limit the capacity of patent owners to undermine competition. See generally Lemley,
supra, at 1957–68 (suggesting changes to rules enacted by standard-setting organizations so as to
provide clarification, specificity, and fairness).
164. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 86 (describing how one firm can hijack an
industry standard at the expense of the industry by “trying to collect fees from other chip makers
that have successful designs”). Changing standards after they have been established can be
expensive. Id. at 86–87.
165. Such patents are common. See Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 43 n.4; BOHANNAN &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 162, at xv. In some instances, patents might not affect competition because
competitors can “invent around” the patented technology, that is, deveop non-infringing
alternatives. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1313 (2009)
(providing statistics regarding the “[e]ase of inventing around” patents in various enumerated
industries); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 802–03 (1987).
166. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 67 n.11.
167. See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1931 (discussing difficulties in switching technologies);
see also Jorge L.Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent
Pledges, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309023.
168. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 26, at 202 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of
ACE-inhibitor drugs).
169. See supra Subsection II.C.1.
170. See Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (arguing that patents generate inefficiencies similar to
those create by monopolies and that those inefficiencies tend to generate higher prices, restrict
supplies, and cause the inefficient allocation of resources); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8
(“So patents can not only encourage innovation, they can also interfere with it.”).
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inefficiencies in designing patent laws.171 All things being equal,
strengthening patent rights will insulate innovators from competition and
thus foster productive inefficiency. Conversely, “[t]o the extent that
competition increases, an increase in [productive efficiency] would be
predicted.”172
Although productive inefficiency has been overlooked in the
development of modern patent law, it is particularly relevant today for at
least three reasons. First, since the late 1970s patent rights in the United
States have grown steadily stronger and stronger patent rights reduce
competition to a greater extent.173 For example, although both courts and
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office once considered software and
business methods ineligible for patent protection, software and business
method patents are common today following a favorable decision by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.174 Although some aspects of
U.S. patent protections have tempered in recent years,175 U.S. law still
provides the strongest form of patent protection in the world.176
Importantly, during this period of increasing patent strength, policy makers
and scholars have not considered the effects of changes to patent law on
productive inefficiency but have instead focused only on traditional
economic concerns.177
Second, productive inefficiency problems may be more pronounced
among innovators than elsewhere in the economy. As economists Michele
171. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 51, at 8; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12 at 294–96
(discussing factors impacting the scope of patent protection). In contrast to patent scholars,
productive inefficiency economists have argued that “government regulation, by sheltering the firm
from competitive pressure, may create an environment in which either managerial or nonmanagerial employees are only selectively rational, that is, [productively] inefficient.” FRANTZ,
supra note 17, at 202.
172. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 116.
173. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 13.
174. See, e.g., State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
578–79 (1999).
175. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3216, 3229−30 (2010) (providing a narrow
holding that the “petitioners’ claims [were] not patentable processes because they [were] attempts to
patent abstract ideas”). The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act weakened the rights provided by
U.S. patent law in some respects. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). For example, the Act
expanded the universe of materials that could be used to invalidate a patent. Compare 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) (2006) (denying patent protection if an invention was “known or used by others in this
country, or patented or described in printed publication in this or a foreign country”), with 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (denying patent protection if an invention was “patented, described in a
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention”). Moreover, the America Invents Act expanded the
defenses to patent infringement based on “prior use rights.” Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1962.
176. See GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CHARTING THE COURSE
30 (2d ed. 2014) (finding that the United States ranks first among twenty-five countries in “the
strength of . . . environment[s] for patents, related rights, and limitations”).
177. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
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Boldrin and David Levine have observed, “not all innovators and managers
are the clever, intelligent individuals usually assumed in economic theory.
In the history of innovation, examples abound of innovators who, far from
maximizing their monopoly profits, have achieved closer to the
minimum.”178 Careful management often cannot offset these shortcomings
because monitoring research and development activities and measuring
related productivity are “both notoriously difficult (and perhaps
counterproductive) managerial tasks.”179 Moreover, when obtaining
patents, innovating firms often must retain legal services, and managers
charged with monitoring those services face additional challenges,
particularly if those managers lack legal training.180 Likewise, technology
startups often rely on outside investors with different goals than the
entrepreneurs that manage the company, and those investors may be unable
to monitor effectively the activities of the managing entrepreneurs.181
Third, concerns over productive inefficiency are particularly important
today because of the effect of productive inefficiency on the
competitiveness of firms in global markets. Firms suffering from
productive inefficiencies fail to utilize their resources to maximum profitmaking and thus cannot compete effectively against more productively
efficient international rivals.182 Unfortunately, although the
competitiveness of U.S. firms in international markets is vital to U.S.
economic prosperity, by many measures U.S. competitiveness has declined
in recent years.183 When U.S. patents limit competition in the United States
178. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 87. On the other hand, fostering maximum
rationality may not be ideal for encouraging invention. Like other creative endeavors,
conventionalism and reasonableness may undermine innovative thought processes.
179. Merges, supra note 21, at 28; see Sichelman, supra note 51, at 360–61 (describing the
risks and costs associated with commercialization of an invention, including but not limited to:
“costly and risky scientific testing, market testing, market research, and marketing”).
180. See John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the PostMarkman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 168 (2005).
181. See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 124 n.60 (2010) (noting the existence of a
principal–agent problem when “the entrepreneur engages in investments to maximize both her
pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains, while the investor is only interested in the former”).
182. See, e.g., CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 2 (discussing the decline in competitiveness
of U.S. manufacturing and arguing specifically that “U.S. productivity levels came to be matched
and exceeded at the same time the superior quality and/or more innovative designs of some foreign
manufactures became widely evident”).
183. Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1914–17. For example, the World Economic Forum (WEF)
measures competitiveness using an analysis of numerous factors related to competiveness, including
the quality of education and training, the efficiency of labor and capital markets, infrastructure,
technological readiness, business sophistication, and innovation. In 2007 and 2008, the United
States topped the WEF competitiveness rankings. Thereafter, however, the United States began to
drop in the rankings, slipping to second in 2009, fourth in 2010, fifth in 2011, and seventh in 2012.
KLAUS SCHWAB, WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, at 13
(2012); KLAUS SCHWAB, WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2010–2011, at
15 (2010); Kai Bucher, US Competitiveness Ranking Continues to Fall; Emerging Markets Are
Closing the Gap, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.weforum.org/news/us
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and increase productive inefficiency, they can undermine the
competitiveness of U.S. firms in global markets.184
B. Quantifying Productive Inefficiency from Patents
As described above, many economists have empirically verified that
increased competition can reduce productive inefficiencies.185
Unfortunately, these economic studies did not explicitly consider the effect
of patent protection on productive inefficiencies, but when patents limit
competition the effects on productive inefficiency are likely to be similar to
those identified by modern economists. Nevertheless, there are at least two
further issues that warrant consideration in evaluating the magnitude of
productive inefficiencies stemming from patent protection.
1. The Complex Effects of Patent Protection
When patents limit competition, they may increase productive
inefficiency186 and thus reduce social welfare. Patents, however, affect
competition and social welfare in many other respects as well. In fact,
patents can sometimes increase competition. For example, the protections
of exclusive patent rights may encourage a technologically lagging firm or
a new entrant to develop technology to compete with dominant
incumbents.187 Moreover, even when patents reduce competition, they can
increase social welfare if the value of a new invention overshadows any
costs stemming from reduced competition.188 For example, when a patent
prompts the discovery of a drug that cures an otherwise terminal illness,
the patent likely increases social welfare even if it fosters productive
inefficiencies. Similarly, a new manufacturing process may substantially
increase a firm’s productivity even if a patent on the process substantially
affects competition.
Even though patents do not always limit competition, they often do so.
Indeed, in order to generate meaningful incentives to invent, patents must

competitiveness-ranking-continues-fall-emerging-markets-are-closing-gap. In 2013, matters
improved slightly, with the WEF ranking the United States fifth in global competitiveness. KLAUS
SCHWAB, WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013–2014, at 15 (2013).
184. See CAVES & BARTON, supra note 19, at 111 (“Import competition (measured by imports’
share of total supply) increases efficiency in industries whose domestic producers are
concentrated.”). However, international competition likely does not improve productive inefficiency
as robustly as domestic competition. CAVES, supra note 19, at 12; see also PORTER, supra note 144,
at 117–24 (arguing that domestic rivalry increases the competitiveness of firms in global markets);
Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1942–43 (arguing that patents that undermine domestic rivalry can
reduce the competitiveness of U.S. firms in global markets).
185. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 54–62, 161–70 and accompanying text.
187. Gilbert, supra note 26, at 174.
188. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 379–80 (suggesting that patent holders may
exploit society’s scarce resources as efficiently as possible).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 5

2078

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

limit competition to a certain extent.189 Discovering new inventions often
requires substantial investment of time, effort, and money, and inventors
and investors recover these expenditures by raising the prices for their
goods and services.190 When patents do not affect competition, competitors
can charge lower prices than the patent owner for similar goods or services
because the competitors do not need to recover any resources invested in
the initial discovery.191 In such a situation, the patent owner cannot recover
the investment in the development of the new invention.
More generally, although patents can increase social welfare in some
respects, they also can generate welfare-reducing productive
inefficiencies.192 Scholars and policy makers therefore should consider all
costs and benefits when designing effective patent laws. At the very least,
productive inefficiency is as relevant to the design of effective patent laws
as allocative inefficiency.193 Both productive inefficiency and allocative
inefficiency are byproducts of patents that limit competition, and patent
scholars universally agree that patents at least sometimes sufficiently
impact competition to generate allocative inefficiencies. By the same logic,
scholars and policy makers should also consider the effect of patents on
productive inefficiency.
2. The Schumpeter–Arrow Debate
The argument that weakening patent protection can increase firm
productivity raises issues addressed in a long-running debate among
economists regarding the effect of competition on innovation. As described
in more detail below, this debate has been largely inconclusive, and such
indeterminacy in the economic literature might suggest that the effect of
competition on productive efficiency is likewise indefinite. This
Subsection rebuts this argument.
Joseph Schumpeter championed one side of the economic debate,
arguing that competition undermines innovation.194 Schumpeter asserted
that in competitive markets firms might be reluctant to invest in projects
189. See Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (noting that while “all patents represent some restraint
on trade,” patents are designed as such because “otherwise, individuals may not produce the good at
all”); Lemley, supra note 54, at 996 (“Indeed, intellectual property rights must permit prices to rise
above marginal cost in some cases if they are to have their intended effect of providing an incentive
to create.”).
190. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 376–77.
191. See id. at 376 (noting variation between monopolistic and competitive pricing).
192. See, e.g., Burk, supra note 51, at 1618 (“Patents are, in fact, specifically designed to
create such [monopolistic] inefficiencies . . . .”).
193. Some economists indicate, however, that limits on competition that do not trigger
antitrust liability may nevertheless produce productive inefficiencies. CAVES & BARTON, supra note
19, at 111 (stating that the level of competition that maximizes productive efficiency occurs “below
the range in which oligopolistic behavior appears to become significant”).
194. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 162, at 8 (describing Schumpeter’s argument that
monopoly tends to foster innovation while competition tends to retard it); Jonathan B. Baker,
Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 578
(2007).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/5

34

Hubbard: The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and Producti

2014]

THE DEBILITATING EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS

2079

that will convey significant benefits to competitors, like basic scientific
research.195 Moreover, economic conditions in some industries also favor
monopolies because of the benefits of economies of scale.196 For example,
smaller firms find it difficult to compete in the pharmaceutical industry in
part because the cost of developing a new drug may be as high as $800
million.197
Economist Kenneth Arrow disagreed with Schumpeter, arguing that
competition promotes innovation better than monopoly.198 Oftentimes,
Arrow noted, the monopolist faces little incentive to innovate because a
new innovation would not increase the monopolist’s market share.199
Rather, the monopolist’s sales of a new product may simply replace the
monopolist’s existing sales. As Steve Jobs observed in 2004, “[W]hat’s the
point of focusing on making the product even better when the only
company you can take business from is yourself?”200 With competition,
firms are encouraged to innovate because sales of a highly innovative
product can increase a firm’s market share.201 Moreover, firms may need to
innovate to avoid losing market share to their innovating competitors. In
the words of the Chief Executive Officer of Intel Corporation Andrew
Grove: “Only the paranoid survive.”202
Although the Schumpeter–Arrow debate has been one of the most
intensely studied aspects of industrial organization, economists have not
been able to crown a clear victor.203 Indeed, numerous factors impact the
195. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 162 , at 8 (positing that under Schumpeter’s
paradigm, competition left firms with too little to invest in substantial innovation); Baker, supra
note 194, at 578 (“[F]irms with a strong pre-existing market position, including monopolists, may
be more willing to pursue R&D if, by virtue of their head start, they have less fear that rivals,
lacking their installed base and reputation, would be able successfully to market products that
emulate their new ideas ”); see also Gilbert, supra note 26, at 175 (“The incentive to invest in R&D
is low if competition post-invention would dissipate all or most of the profits.”).
196. Gilbert, supra note 26, at 186. Monopolies may also enjoy advantages in raising capital to
invest in research and development. Id.
197. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 212.
198. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 162 , at 8 (“Arrow observed that competitors have
more to gain from innovating, and much more to lose from failing to do so.”); Baker, supra note
194, at 578 (stating that Kenneth Arrow provided an alternative theory characterized by the logic
that “competition rather than monopoly promotes innovation”).
199. Baker, supra note 194, at 578.
200. Tim Carmody, Why Tim Cook Is the Best Choice to Run Apple, WIRED (Aug. 25, 2011,
8:41 AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2011/08/why-tim-cook/.
201. See Gilbert, supra note 26, at 165 (noting that under Arrow’s paradigm, competitive firms
can attain a higher differential return if the competitive firm captures the same benefit from
innovation as the monopolist); id. at 179 (“Monopolies that are protected from innovation
competition are reluctant to innovate because they merely replace one profit flow with another,
while new competitors capture the entire benefit of an innovation.”).
202. See ANDREW S. GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVIVE 3 (1996).
203. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 176–77 (“An ‘optimum’ degree of competition, which
holds across all industries and at all times, for promoting technical progress cannot be established
by appeal to either theoretical argument or empirical analysis.”); Baker, supra note 194, at 577
(“While economists widely accept that competition encourages firms to improve product attributes

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 5

2080

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

effect of market structure on innovation, including the nature of the
innovation (product or process) and the extent to which the innovation
differs from existing technology.204 Empirical analyses have not been able
to cut through this theoretical morass, as numerous studies on the effects of
competition on innovation have been largely inconclusive.205 One scholar
reviewing the literature concluded: “There is little evidence that there is an
optimal degree of competition to promote [research and development].”206
One might argue that the indeterminacy of the Schumpeter–Arrow
debate undermines the assertion that patents that limit competition foster
productive inefficiency. For firms focusing on the development of new
products and services, a more productively efficient firm likely will more
often succeed in innovating. If competition does not promote innovation
for these firms, however, how can it produce the same results under the
guise of productive efficiency?
Such a critique of the effect of competition on productive inefficiency is
misplaced for two reasons. First, the indeterminacy of the Schumpeter–
Arrow debate does not demonstrate the invalidity of Schumpeter’s
argument that monopolists capture the benefits of innovation or Arrow’s
assertion that firms innovate out of fear of losing market share. Rather, the
debate is unresolved because Schumpeter and Arrow identified
countervailing concerns and neither uniformly predominates. By
closely related to price, economists have not been so quick to say that competition encourages
innovation.”); Gilbert, supra note 26, at 195 (“The economic model of innovation competition does
not establish a clear favorite model for empirical analysis.”); id. at 161–62.
204. See Gilbert, supra note 26, at 165–68, 187. Some of the economic scholarship regarding
the Schumpeter–Arrow debate unfortunately relies upon unrealistic simplifications regarding patent
law. For instance, some economists assert that competition undermines innovation because
innovators are unable to prevent competitors from piggybacking off innovators’ investments in
developing new technologies. Id. at 164. In actuality, of course, innovators can often prevent such
freeriding by obtaining patent protection and other intellectual property rights. Conversely, other
economists contend that monopolies undermine innovation if the “innovator enjoys perfect and
perpetual exclusive property rights to its invention.” Id. Patent rights, however, are not perpetual
nor do they “perfectly” eliminate all benefits to competitors from the invention. Brett M.
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 290–91 (2007); Gilbert,
supra note 26, at 202. Economists have noted other important considerations omitted from earlier
economic analyses of the effects of market structure on innovation. For example, monopolies may
be helpful in developing human capital that later matures in competitive markets. Gilbert, supra
note 26, at 184. On the other hand, competition may support the pursuit of more diverse research
projects than is possible under monopoly conditions. Id. at 185.
205. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 180–82 (collecting studies); Douglas H. Ginsburg &
Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4
(2012) (finding that “it is not surprising that the empirical literature attempting to link market
structure and product market competition . . . to innovation is inconclusive”); see also Gilbert,
supra note 26, at 187–204 (collecting and analyzing numerous empirical studies). One reason that
empirical studies have been unable to reach decisive conclusions is that the relationship between
innovation and market structure runs both ways: one can analyze both whether market structure
affects innovation and whether innovation affects market structure. See Gilbert, supra note 26, at
195–96.
206. Gilbert, supra note 26, at 206.
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identifying another benefit to competition, productive inefficiency analysis
adds new support for Arrow’s position but does not alter the underlying
nature of the trade-off that lies at the heart of the debate.207 Second, the
Schumpeter–Arrow debate does not obviate consideration of productive
inefficiency because the debate focuses only on innovation, and productive
inefficiencies can arise in parts of firms that are only indirectly related to
the development of new products and services. For example, even when
increased competition fails to encourage pharmaceutical companies to
develop more drugs, it might encourage them to embrace superior
manufacturing techniques.208 When competition does not increase
innovation but nonetheless increases productive efficiency, social welfare
increases.209 Thus, despite the indeterminacy of the Schumpeter–Arrow
debate, scholars and policy makers should consider the effect of patents on
productive inefficiency when designing patent regimes. The next
Subsections explore three unresolved debates in patent law that would
benefit from such a consideration of productive inefficiency.
C. Promoting Commercialization
Productive inefficiency analysis helps to clarify a long-running,
contentious debate in patent law regarding the commercialization of
patented inventions.
1. The Commercialization Problem
Every year, hundreds of thousands of inventions are patented,210 but
many of them are never commercialized. By one estimate, “[a]bout half,
probably more, of all patented inventions in the United States are never
commercially exploited.”211 Without a doubt, “[m]any of these
undeveloped inventions are commercially worthless,”212 such as U.S.
Patent No. 6,293,874, which covers a “User-Operated Amusement
Apparatus for Kicking the User’s Buttocks.”213 However, many
underdeveloped inventions are likely valuable, and the insufficient
commercialization of these inventions represents lost opportunities for
increasing social welfare.214 Standing alone, an invention does not improve
social welfare unless it ultimately spurs the development of commercial
products or services.215 Commercialization problems can also arise from
207. Indeed, in a situation in which the considerations identified by Schumpeter and Arrow are
in equipoise, an analysis of productive efficiency may provide a basis for favoring competition.
208. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Section II.B.
210. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1963–
2013, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
211. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 343–44 (discussing empirical data).
212. Id. at 343.
213. U.S. Patent No. 6,293,874 (filed Jan. 4, 2000).
214. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1069 (discussing problems of underdevelopment of
patented inventions); Sichelman, supra note 51, at 363–64.
215. See Sichelman, supra note 51, at 354.
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delayed commercialication of inventions. Ceteris paribus, obtaining
benefits earlier is better for society than obtaining those benefits later.
At least two related factors substantially contribute to the delayed or
forgone commercialization of patented inventions. First, U.S. patent law
encourages inventors to patent early in the innovation process, well before
the inventor has taken many significant steps towards
commercialization.216 Because patents issue to the first inventor to file a
patent application, inventors must patent as soon as possible or risk losing
the patent to another inventor.217 Indeed, multiple independent inventors
are oftentimes working simultaneously to discover the same invention.218
Because independent invention is not a defense to patent infringement, the
second inventor to file a patent application generally will be unable to
profit from the invention.219 Patent law further encourages inventors to
patent an invention as soon as possible, because commercialization—either
by the inventor or a third party—can preclude the inventor from obtaining
a patent. Specifically, U.S. patent law bars an inventor from obtaining a
patent if a product incorporating the invention has been sold anywhere in
the world before the inventor files for a patent.220 Unfortunately, firms that
are best equipped to invent quickly may not be best suited to
commercialize, particularly when successful commercialization requires
sales on a large scale to be profitable.221 An inventing firm might license or
assign their inventions to firms better equipped to commercialize them, but
216. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
72 (2009); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (pressuring early patent filings); Sichelman, supra note
51, at 350–51 (“[B]ecause of the reward theory’s preference for early patenting and the weak
disclosure standards applied by the Patent Office, patents are granted at the initial stages of
conception, which . . . can lead to the significant underdevelopment of inventions.”(footnote
omitted)).
217. Recently, the United States shifted from a system that awarded patent rights only to the
first person to discover an invention to a system that awards patent rights only to the first inventor
to file a patent application. William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 367
(2013).
218. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 712 (2012)
(“The overwhelming majority of inventions, including the overwhelming majority of so-called
‘pioneering’ inventions, are in fact developed by individuals or groups working independently at
roughly the same time.”).
219. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text; Gregory N. Mandel, The Public
Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L. REV. 261 (2014) (“[P]atent law prohibits a later
independent inventor from obtaining patent protection on the same subject matter as an earlier
inventor.”). An inventor who fails to patent but commercializes her invention may be able to
continue to practice the invention if she qualifies as a prior user under 35 U.S.C. § 273.
220. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). In some cases, the inventor may be able to obtain a one-year
grace period for this bar. Id. § 102(b).
221. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 205–06 (hypothesizing an efficient procedure to
mitigate the “early stage innovative disabilities of large size”); Sichelman, supra note 51, at 367
(“[T]here is no reason to expect that inventors who win the race to patent will be the best
commercializers.”).
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productive inefficiencies and transaction costs may prevent inventors from
executing the transfer of rights.222 Indeed, highly innovative firms
sometimes refuse to sell or license their patents until they are facing
bankruptcy.223
The second factor that contributes to the underdevelopment of patented
inventions is that the steps towards commercialization that follow early
patenting are uncertain and expensive.224 For instance, to commercialize an
invention an inventor often must develop a prototype, a manufacturing
process, and distribution channels. Innovators also frequently perform
market experimentation, including “studies to assess the effectiveness of
the invention, testing commercially the public’s demand for the invention,
and informing customers or others about the invention,”225 and the cost of
this testing can be significant.226 Indeed, by some estimates the cost of
commercializing a patented invention substantially exceeds prepatented
invention expenses.227 Unfortunately, even an inventor who is willing to
invest in commercialization may fail to produce a commercially successful
product or service because there is a particularly high probability of failure
in developing innovative products.228 Facing these challenges, many patent
owners do not even attempt to commercialize their inventions, and opt
instead to profit from their patents through litigation.229
222. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
223. For example, Kodak did not sell its portfolio of patents until after it declared bankruptcy
in early 2012. John Brodkin, Kodak Declares Bankruptcy, Presses on with Patent Suits, Digital
Strategy, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2012/01/kodakdeclares-bankruptcy-presses-on-with-patent-suits-digital-strategy/; Andrew Martin, Kodak to Sell Digital
Imaging Patents for $525 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/kodak-to-sell-patents-for-525-million.html. Similarly,
Nortel Networks declared bankruptcy in 2009, and subsequently sold its portfolio for $4.5
billion. Steven Church et al., Apple Joins Microsoft, RIM in $4.5 Billion Buy of Nortel
Patents, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2011, 12:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0701/nortel-sellspatent-portfolio-for-4-5-billion-to-group.html. See generally CLAYTON M.
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA (1997) (analyzing the factors that lead technologically
successful firms to fail).
224. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 192 (providing that at the early stages of innovative
development, modest resources are frequently sufficient, however “later stage development often
incurs much greater expense”).
225. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1099.
226. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 65, at 339–40; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 351(“Often
the capital required for the market testing and product commercialization phase is tremendous.”).
227. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 371–72 (“[P]ost-invention development and
commercialization expenses dwarf pre-invention expenses in nearly all industries.”).
228. Id. at 361 & n.116 (collecting numerous supporting authorities); see also Abramowicz,
supra note 43, at 1101 (“The problem of inventors’ not engaging in sufficient commercial
experimentation is particularly severe for inventions that have a small probability of large
commercial success and a great probability of failure. Once an invention falls into the public
domain, someone considering commercializing the invention faces the prospect of bearing the entire
cost of the experimentation if it fails.”).
229. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1073 (noting that patent owners may forego exercising
their “development option” in favor of their “litigation option”).
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2. Existing Proposals
Although many scholars have recognized the importance of
commercializing patented inventions, these scholars differ sharply in their
proposals for increasing commercialization. Importantly, they also disagree
on the extent to which exclusive rights that limit competition will
encourage commercialization.
One group of scholars asserts that strong patent rights best promote the
commercialization of inventions. The most influential of these analyses is
Edmond Kitch’s “prospect theory” of patent law.230 Noting that the
traditional justification of patent law posits that a patent “enables an
inventor to capture the returns from his investment in the invention,” Kitch
argued that this “reward theory [of patent law] offers an incomplete view
of the functions of the patent system” because it fails to recognize the
effect of patent rights on postinvention commercialization efforts.231 In
explaining these effects, Kitch famously analogized patents to mineral
prospects.232 Kitch noted that awarding exclusive rights to extract minerals
in a location encourages individuals to invest thereafter the significant
capital required for successful mining operations.233 Kitch asserted that
patents similarly promote the subsequent commercialization of inventions
by awarding to patentees the exclusive “opportunity to develop a known
technological possibility . . . . shortly after its discovery.”234 Kitch noted
that without patent protection, an innovator might be reluctant to invest in
commercial development because the fruits of that labor may “produce
unpatentable information appropriable by competitors.”235 Kitch therefore
concluded that the prospect function of patents justifies awarding patents
well before commercial exploitation is feasible.236 Moreover, Kitch
asserted that the prospect function of patents is a “significant, if not the
predominant, function of the American patent system as it has operated in
fact.”237
230. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977) (“[T]he view of the patent system offered here conceives of the process of
technological innovation as one in which resources are brought to bear upon an arrary of prospects,
each with its own associated sets of probabilities of costs and returns.”). But see Abramowicz, supra
note 43, at 1070 (“[O]ur patent system is actually not much of a prospect system.”).
231. Kitch, supra note 230, at 266.
232. Id. (arguing that the mineral claim industry serves as a close analog to the patent
industry).
233. Id. at 274.
234. Id. at 266.
235. Id. at 276; accord Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1101 (noting that if a patent succeeds,
the original patent holder will likely have to fend off third parties seeking to enter the market and
claim some portion of the market share that the original holder enjoyed).
236. Kitch, supra note 230, at 267.
237. Id. For example, application of patent law to the pharmaceutical industry exhibits
prominent prospect theory features. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1095; Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante
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Some more recent scholars have embraced Kitch’s argument that
exclusive rights promote commercialization,238 while tempering prospect
theory with a measure of additional competition. For example, Michael
Abramowicz recommends extending the duration of some patents to
encourage commercialization.239 Abramowicz recognizes, however, that
patent term extensions could generate additional costs, most notably a
deadweight loss from allocative inefficiency: “If a patent term is too short,
the patentee might have socially insufficient incentives to develop the
patent by engaging in nonpatentable research and commercialization
activities, but if it is too long, excessive deadweight loss will result.”240 To
balance these considerations, Abramowicz recommends limiting patent
term extensions to those likely to foster commercialization. Under
Abramowicz’s proposal, extensions should be offered at the end of a
patent’s normal term “when the additional development activities an
extended term would enable and the costs of extended protection should be
clear.”241 Moreover, to reduce the deadweight loss from allocative
inefficiency, Abramowicz proposes apportioning patent term extensions
through auctions.242 Abramowicz contends that such auctions with multiple
bidders would provide sufficient competitive elements to ensure that the
social benefits of the proposed patent term extensions would exceed the
deadweight losses from allocative inefficiencies.243
Other scholars likewise assert that hybrid solutions can best promote
the commercialization of patented inventions but advocate for even
stronger competitive dimensions.244 Ted Sichelman recommends that U.S.
Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 141 (2004). In part
due to the requirements of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, commercializing a
pharmaceutical invention is enormously expensive. Drug companies would be reluctant to invest in
such commercialization without the protection of exclusive patent rights.
238. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) (arguing that strong exclusive rights are “necessary to
facilitate investment in the complex, costly, and risky commercialization activities required to turn
nascent inventions into new goods and services”).
239. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1098.
240. Id. at 1106. Indeed, because inventors often race to obtain patent rights, an inventor will
often patent long before commercialization is possible, which will “result in shorter effective patent
terms.” Id.
241. Id. at 1108.
242. See id. at 1108–20.
243. See id. at 1109 (arguing that competition between bidders in auctions will increase
incentives to invest in future inventions and that the small windfalls represented by term extensions
would be “part of the incentive to create”).
244. For example, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have argued that prospect theory should be
applied selectively to certain industries, with patenting in the early stages of technical development
most appropriate for pharmaceutical inventions. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1616 (2003) (“The prospect vision of patents maps most closely
onto invention in the pharmaceutical industry.”). Burk and Lemley caution, however, against early
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patent law be amended to create a new form of intellectual property right,
which he terms a “commercialization patent.”245 Importantly, “a
commercialization patent not only would provide a negative right to
exclude others from making and selling the same or equivalent products,
but also would include an affirmative equitable and legal right to its holder
to make and sell the product.”246 In an infringement suit against the owner
of a commercialization patent, the owner of a traditional invention patent
would be able to obtain only “a low, but fairly reasonable, fixed royalty
rate.”247 While maintaining some exclusivity for the owner of the
traditional patent, commercialization patents would thus foster substantial
competition between the owner of the traditional patent and the recipient of
a commercialization patent.248 Moreover, because a commercialization
patent would grant narrow protection restricted to the product described in
the particular grant, other innovators could obtain their own
commercialization patents to develop different products from the
underlying invention.249 Sichelman asserts that the expanded competition
made possible by commercialization patents would reduce the deadweight
loss from allocative inefficiency caused by traditional patent rights.250
Other approaches to commercialization go further than Sichelman’s
approach in promoting competition. For example, some scholars advocate
for strengthening patenting requirements, so that patents would become
available at a time less removed from commercialization, thereby moving
the “inventor further down the development path before examination,”
while concomitantly giving “the inventor a clearer picture of the possible
commercial value of the invention” before obtaining a patent.251 Other
scholars propose strengthening the experimental-use defense to patent
infringement to allow competitors to begin the lengthy process of
commercializing a patented invention during the term of the patent, so that
robust commercial competition could commence immediately upon the
patenting for isolated segments of human DNA due to concerns that overlapping patent claims
would discourage further innovation. Id. at 1624–27.
245. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 345–46.
246. Id. at 346 (emphasis omitted). In contrast, traditional patent rights provide only the
negative rights to prevent infringers from making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing into
the United States a patented invention. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
247. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 346.
248. To ensure that inventors retain sufficient incentives to invent, Sichelman recommends
“giv[ing] the invention patent holder a head start to commercialize its invention, for example, three
years after issuance, extended for regulatory and Patent Office delays during the commercialization
process.” Id. at 406.
249. See id. at 401 (arguing that commercialization patents “should be limited exactly to the
product described in the specification” because the justification for such patents is to “encourage
the development of specific products not currently in the marketplace” (emphasis omitted)).
250. Id. at 408.
251. E.g., Cotropia, supra note 216, at 119–20.
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patent’s expiration.252 Some foreign patent laws go even further by
entitling innovators to compulsory licenses to uncommercialized patents.253
3. Incorporating Productive Inefficiency Analysis
For decades, accomplished and insightful scholars have debated—with
no clear victor—the best approach to fostering the commercialization of
patented inventions. The reason for the lack of resolution is that a difficult
balancing of costs and benefits lies at the heart of the debate and
competition potentially impacts both sides of this balancing. In analyzing
this trade-off, scholars have relied on traditional neoclassical economics.
For example, prospect theorists assume that inventors are profit
maximizers and argue that freeriding by competitors can prevent inventors
from pursuing profitable commercialization opportunities.254 Other
scholars argue that the same reduction in competition that protects
incentives to commercialize will create deadweight losses through
allocative inefficiencies.
While insightfully juggling neoclassical economic concerns, these
scholars have omitted from their analyses considerations of productive
inefficiency. For example, although Kitch notes that “many important
inventions are patented early in their development,” he fails to consider
whether the early patenting of the invention might have delayed
commercialization.255 Similarly, while Abramowicz recognizes the
importance of competition in the structure of his auctions for patent term
extensions, he fails to consider whether competition is also needed during
the commercialization phase to reduce productive inefficiency. Even
scholars who generally embrace competition have not realized the full
scope of the benefits stemming from competition. For instance, in arguing
for some exclusive rights to commercialize, Sichelman asserts that strong
252. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1953–57 (discussing the experimental use defense).
253. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1107; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 394; see also Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
(revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967) (describing compulsory patent licenses). Such laws are rarely
invoked. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 395; see, e.g., Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India Orders
Bayer to License a Patented Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/
13/business/global/india-overrules-bayer-allowing-generic-drug.html (reporting that the government
of India granted a compulsory license for a patented cancer drug because the price charged by the
patent owner was “unaffordable to most of the nation”).
254. See Kitch, supra note 230, at 276 (“[T]he patent owner has an incentive to make
investments to maximize the value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will
produce unpatentable information appropriable by competitors.”). Some information related to
commercialization can be protected by improvement patents or other forms of intellectual property,
like trade secrets or copyrights. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1091. Likewise, first mover
effects can prevent competitors from successfully profiting from another firm’s commercialization
efforts. Id. Many of the fruits of efforts to commercialize, however, are not protectable by these
mechanisms. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 373.
255. See Kitch, supra note 230, at 271.
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patent rights often will fail to promote commercialization because
inventors may not be effective commercializers and because transaction
costs may prevent inventors from transferring their rights to superior
commercializers.256 Patent-related productive inefficiencies may make
matters worse by undermining inventors’ effectiveness in both
commercialization and licensing.257
In fact, productive inefficiencies are likely to arise during the
commercialization of a patented invention, particularly if exclusive rights
insulate a commercializing firm from competition. Employees involved in
commercialization may be reluctant to develop new products or services, in
part because it takes effort “to convert knowledge from a feeling or an idea
into a form that is useful for the firm.”258 Conserving effort and favoring
old habits, employees may be slow to pursue opportunities to
commercialize inventions. Moreover, employees may be disinclined to
attempt to commercialize an invention due to loss aversion, status quo
bias, and hyperbolic discounting because the chance of failure is often high
and the costs of a failed commercialization effort are typically easier to
measure than the forgone benefits of a new product that is never
developed.259 Management can easily quantify the time and money
invested in the development of a new product and compare those expenses
to the profits of a new product. In contrast, when an employee delays
working to commercialize a new invention, management frequently will be
unable to quantify the impact on the firm’s profits because of the
substantial uncertainty regarding the cost of commercialization, the
likelihood of success, and the amount of profits a new product would
generate if successful.260 Employees with responsibilities related to new
product development therefore may not optimally exert themselves,
particularly when existing products continue to provide alternate
opportunities.261 Instead, employees tasked with commercializing an
invention may wait until other technological or commercial developments
reduce the risk of commercializing the invention.262 Even employees
working on tasks tangentially related to new product development, like
256. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 368–70.
257. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 4, 34 (arguing that cognitive biases will
hamper patnet licensing); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 701 (noting the downstream effects
of cognitive biases on commercialization).
258. FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 97.
259. See supra notes 83–86, 159 and accompanying text.
260. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1075; Sichelman, supra note 51, at 361.
261. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 266 (“[W]hen someone can sell at high prices
because of legal protection from imitators, he or she will not expend much effort looking for better
or cheaper ways to do things.”).
262. See Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1075–78 (describing the benefits of waiting to
commercialize an invention).
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marketing, may exhibit high levels of productive inefficiency due to the
comparative ease of quantifying failed commercialization efforts.263
Scholars and policy makers thus should consider the impact of
productive inefficiency in crafting laws that foster the commercialization
of patented inventions. Considerations of productive inefficiency will not
change the nature of the trade-off that underlies commercialization policy,
but productive inefficiency analysis provides additional support for
arguments in favor of greater competition, like Sichelman’s, because
competition reduces productive inefficiency. Even if die-hard prospect
theorists are correct that competition reduces some incentives to
commercialize, competition can increase the responsiveness of firms to
incentives, so that smaller incentives to commercialize paradoxically may
produce greater effect.264
D. Patent Scope
Productive-inefficiency analysis also provides new insights into an
unresolved debate regarding the appropriate scope of patent protection.
The scope of a patent largely depends on a patent’s “claims,” which are
numbered sentences at the end of the patent (and the patent application
before the patent issues) that “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]
the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the
invention.”265 Inventors often strive to obtain patents with expansive
claims because broader exclusive rights are more valuable to the inventor.
Broad patent claims are more likely to be infringed by competitors, and
therefore may allow the patentee to enjoy higher profits during the term of
the patent. However, patent law prevents inventors from obtaining
exclusive rights that exceed the scope of the inventors’ discoveries. For
example, an inventor must describe the invention in sufficiently clear,
concise, and exact terms so as to enable any person skilled in the
technological field to which the patent pertains to practice it, and patent
claims cannot exceed the scope of enablement.266 Nevertheless, numerous
other doctrines allow inventors to obtain patent protection that exceeds the
scopes of their inventive efforts.267 Moreover, patent examiners and courts
263. Furthermore, the uncertainty related to potential commercialization limits the capacity of
management to reduce employees’ productive inefficiencies. See supra Subsection III.C.2.
264. See Gerla, supra note 17, at 236 (“To the extent that rivalry curbs [productive
inefficiencies] in firms, it can serve to facilitate the creation and commercial exploitation of
innovations.” (footnote omitted)).
265. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
266. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). Such disclosure is often described as “the quid pro quo of the right to
exclude.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
267. Sichelman, supra note 51, at 350. For example, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and
courts assess only whether a person of ordinary skill in the relevant technological field could
practice the invention “without undue experimentation,” thereby granting patent examiners and
courts substantial discretion in assessing whether the inventor has satisfied the enablement
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are systematically biased in favor of supporting inventors’ efforts to obtain
broad patent protection. The U.S. Patent Office requires patent examiners
to grant patent applications unless an examiner can demonstrate that a
patent should not issue. Similarly, courts hold patents valid unless a
challenger proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.268
Scholars disagree regarding the effect of awarding patents of such broad
scope. Some scholars consider broad patents to be problematic because
they raise the cost of developing improvements to existing, patented
technology.269 Prospect theorists disagree, arguing that awarding inventors
broad patent rights promotes innovation: “This puts the patent owner in a
position to coordinate the search for technological and market
enhancement of the patent’s value so that duplicative investments are not
made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers.”270
Productive-inefficiency analysis cautions against awarding patents with
scopes substantially exceeding their disclosures. Insulated from
competition, the owner of such a broad patent may ineffectively develop
the patent’s full scope. Even if a broad patent discourages duplicative
research efforts, the patent owner’s efforts may suffer from substantial
productive inefficiencies regarding the development of goods and services
that fall within the scope of the patentee’s exclusive rights but outside of
the patent’s disclosure. In many cases, inventors are likely to focus their
subsequent research and commercialization efforts on the aspects of the
invention disclosed in the patent description and not on uses of the
invention that are far removed from the inventor’s prepatenting
activities.271 Reducing the wasted costs from duplicative efforts is not per
se more important than improving the quality of those efforts. Indeed, as an
requirement. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Also, the level of scrutiny applied to a patent application appears to depend substantially
upon which patent examiner is working on the patent. See Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking
Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 155, 170 (2004) (noting that patent
examiners “differ sharply in terms of their tendency to instigate claim language alterations”).
Another doctrine that allows inventors to obtain patents that substantially exceed the scope of the
disclosed invention is the doctrine of equivalents, which extends patent protection to “equivalent”
technologies that fall outside of the literal scope of the patent claims. William R. Hubbard, Efficient
Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327, 347–48 (2009). A patent applicant also may strategically
draft an unclear claim that “enables the examiner to adopt a narrow, valid construction while also
allowing the patentee to argue a broad, but invalid, construction in a later patent infringement
dispute.” Id. at 346.
268. See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2008). Moreover, patents are statutorily presumed to be valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; Sean B.
Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 995 (2013).
269. See Kitch, supra note 230, at 268 n.9; Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 870.
270. Kitch, supra note 230, at 276.
271. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 873 (arguing that inventors have the tendency to
focus on past experience).
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empirical matter, firms often fail to develop improvements to patented
technology until threatened by outside competition.272
This concern is particularly salient regarding patents on chemical
compounds. To obtain a patent for a new chemical compound, an inventor
must show both that the compound is new and that the compound is
“useful.”273 Patents cannot issue for new compounds if the patentee is
merely studying the compound with the goal of discovering a use.274 The
typical justification for this rule is that allowing a patent on a compound
before identifying a use for the compound would prevent others from
researching the uses of the compound. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in
Brenner v. Manson, until a new compound is “shown to be useful, the
metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation.
It may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area.”275 Once an
inventor discovers a use for the compound, however, the patent applies to
all uses of the compound, even those uses that are unrelated to the use
identified by the patentee in satisfying the utility requirement.276 Consistent
with prospect theory, a patent on a new compound with many uses thus
may provide an inventor with exclusive rights to uses of the compound that
the inventor has not disclosed or discovered.
Productive inefficiency analysis identifies a problem with awarding
broad patents on chemical compounds that extend to undiscovered uses.
Although a patentee might investigate alternate uses of a compound (or
license others to do so), such activities are less likely because the patent
protects the patentee from competition regarding those alternate uses and
thus exacerbates productive inefficiencies. Indeed, patent owners are more
likely to focus on uses related to those already identified in the patent. For
compounds with few alternate uses, patents covering undisclosed uses
likely will not significantly affect productive inefficiency. But many
compounds have substantial alternate uses, and the harm to society from
the delayed innovation regarding such uses may be substantial.277 For these
compounds, tailoring the patentee’s exclusive rights more closely to the
uses actually disclosed in the patent may maximize social welfare.278
272. Id. at 872.
273. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
274. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (declining to award
patent protection for “research intermediates”).
275. 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
276. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 ( 2012).
277. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 51, at 233 (noting that “[m]onopolies innovate as little as
possible and only when forced to . . . .”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at 852; see, e.g.,
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980) (reviewing a patent on a new
use for a known product and noting that “[d]evelopment of new uses for existing chemicals is thus a
major component of practical chemical research”).
278. U.S. patent law “permits parties to obtain [new] patents on new uses for existing
inventions.” Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1100.
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One example of a chemical compound that may have many alternate
uses is a form of synthetic human DNA known as cDNA.279 Recently, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the patentability of cDNA in Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.280 The defendant in the case,
Myriad Genetics, Inc., discovered that mutations of two human genes,
labeled BRCA1 and BRCA2, substantially increase the chance of breast
and ovarian cancer.281 Myriad Genetics obtained patents on the genes both
as isolated fragments of naturally occurring human DNA and as synthetic
cDNA sequences.282 In reviewing the validity of these patents, the Supreme
Court concluded that patent protection was not available for the genes as
isolated segments of naturally occurring DNA, but readily affirmed the
patentability of the cDNA segments.283 Importantly, although Myriad
obtained patents covering all uses of the cDNA versions of BRCA1 and
BRCA2, Myriad disclosed only certain uses for those synthetic genes, such
as diagnosing whether a patient faces an increased risk of breast and
ovarian cancer by determining if the patient’s DNA includes the mutated
BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes.284 As a result, Myriad’s patents would cover—
but importantly not disclose—any later discovered uses for the synthetic
genes, such as treatments for remedying the identified genetic mutations or
related cancers.285 Although Myriad might profit from developing such
new uses, productive inefficiencies within Myriad—if unchecked by
competition—could slow the progress of the research necessary to discover
those treatments. Moreover, Myriad’s patents may implicate medical
conditions unrelated to breast and ovarian cancer because mutations in one
gene may cause many different types of cancer286 and because genes often
279. See Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for
Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2013) (discussing cDNA generally); see also
Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1097 (noting that prospect theory might have problematic effects
when applied to DNA patents).
280. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
281. Id. at 2112.
282. Id. at 2113; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995) (assigning a human
genetics patent to, inter alios, Myriad Genetics); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995)
(same); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed Jan. 20, 1998) (same); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed
June 7, 1995) (same); U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996) (same); U.S. Patent No.
5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996) (same); U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed Mar. 20, 2000) (same).
283. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 (“cDNA does not present the same
obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments.”).
284. Id. at 2112–13.
285. Since losing their battle in the Supreme Court, Myriad has returned to asserting its patents
against competitors that test for mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Joe Mullin, Myriad,
Fresh off Supreme Court Loss, Keeps on Suing over Gene Patents, ARS TECHNICA (July 11, 2013,
8:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/myriad-fresh-off-supreme-court-loss-keepson-suing-over-gene-patents/.
286. Ohio State Univ. Div. of Nephrology, Study Shows That Mutations In One Gene Cause
Many Cancers, OHIO ST. UNIV., http://internalmedicine.osu.edu/nephrology/article.cfm?ID=5511
(last visited Aug. 11, 2014). Indeed, Myriad’s patents explicitly state that mutations in the BRCA1
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overlap one another.287 Once again, Myriad might profit from exploring the
relationships among BRCA1, BRCA2, and other types of cancer. Without
sufficient competition, though, productive inefficiencies could prompt
Myriad to focus only on areas of existing expertise, such as breast and
ovarian cancer.
One promising approach to limiting the productive inefficiencies from
patents on multiuse compounds is to establish a robust experimental-use
defense to promote competition regarding the discovery of alternate uses.
Today, U.S. patent law usually prevents competitors from experimenting
on patented technology. Although there is a general experimental-use
defense, current U.S. patent law limits it to experimentation “for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry.”288 For example, an experiment “in furtherance of the alleged
infringer’s legitimate business” typically does not qualify for the
defense.289 As a result, patent law often limits competition—thereby
fostering productive inefficiency—regarding the development of
alternative uses for patented compounds. Although the experimental-use
defense is narrow in most areas of technology, U.S. patent law contains a
stronger statutory experimental-use defense in areas of technology
“reasonably related” to the manufacture, use, and sale of drugs.290 For these
technologies, patent law insulates much research regarding alternate uses
of drugs from claims of patent infringement, thereby limiting, to some
extent, the productive inefficiencies stemming from patents on drug-related
compounds.291 For example, although patents on cDNA could contribute to
substantial productive inefficiencies for the reasons noted above, the
existing experimental-use defense may mitigate this problem.
Nevertheless, the statutory defense for experimentation reasonably related
to drugs does not fully address productive-inefficiency concerns because
the defense does not apply to basic scientific research regarding patented
compounds.292 Moreover, outside of these areas of technology the
experimental-use defense is extremely narrow.
and BRCA2 genes relate to breast cancer, ovarian cancer, colorectal cancer, and prostate cancer and
“may be involved in the initiation and/or progression of other types of tumors.” U.S. Patent No.
5,693,473 col. 19 ln. 27–29 (filed June 7, 1995).
287. Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing Ethical and
Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 119, 153 (2009) (“And
while biologists have often assumed that genes are compact, the new research indicates that genes
can be sprawling, with far-flung protein-coding and regulatory regions that overlap with other
genes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
288. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
289. Id.
290. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines “drug”
to include any “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease in man.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
291. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005).
292. Id. at 205–06.
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Therefore, a stronger defense to patent infringement for
experimentation related to the development of alternate uses for chemical
compounds may help to reduce productive inefficiencies. Such a defense
could be tailored to preserve the patentee’s incentives to discover and
disclose a new compound. For example, to qualify for the experimental use
defense, patent law could require a competitor to demonstrate that its
research targets a use that is substantially different from any uses for the
compound identified in the patent, utilized by the patentee, or found in the
prior art. Furthermore, the defense could apply only to experimentation by
a competitor and not to the commercial use of the fruits of such
experimentation. Accordingly, to commercialize the alternative use a
competitor would need to license the patent from the patent owner. To
facilitate such licensing, the competitor could seek a patent on the method
of using the compound for the newly discovered use.293 Such an expanded
but focused experimental use defense would facilitate the development of
alternate uses for patented compounds by reducing productive
inefficiencies while maintaining robust incentives to patent and disclose
new compounds.
E. Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office
Considerations of productive inefficiency also shed new light on an
unresolved debate regarding the examination of patent applications by the
U.S. Patent Office. The U.S. Patent Office accepts more than half of a
million applications for patents every year.294 Unfortunately, the
examination of these applications is, in the eyes of many observers, an
ineffective process.295 Though the U.S. Patent Office strives to issue only
clear, valid patents, mistakes are common, in part because budgetary
constraints force patent examiners to spend very little time reviewing each
patent application.296 By one estimate, patent examiners spend on average
only eighteen hours reviewing a typical patent application.297 As a result,
293. Abramowicz, supra note 43, at 1100 ( “[T]he current [U.S.] patent system permits parties
to obtain [new] patents on new uses for existing inventions.”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 11, at
860.
294. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 210.
295. Patent examination is also a slow process. Today, patent applications languish for about
eighteen months before receiving an initial review by an examiner, and the entire examination
process typically lasts almost thirty months. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DATA
VISUALIZATION CENTER, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited Aug.
11, 2014).
296. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60
STAN. L. REV. 45, 61 (2007); see Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 675, 679 (2009) (arguing that examiners make mistakes given the time constraints
they face). A U.S. patent can be invalid for many reasons. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2012).
297. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 135 (2002).
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approximately half of the patents whose validity is tested through litigation
are ultimately declared invalid.298 Moreover, the scopes of patents issued
by the U.S. Patent Office are notoriously unclear.299
Unfortunately, these shortcomings in patent examination significantly
reduce social welfare. For example, an invalid patent can raise costs for
consumers and competitors without providing the offsetting benefit of a
new invention.300 Similarly, when the scope of a patent is unclear, it may
be difficult to determine if a patent is infringed or invalid.301 Facing invalid
or unclear patents, some firms may license unnecessarily or eschew some
socially beneficial commercial activity altogether.302 Although competitors
can challenge invalid and unclear patents in court, the cost of doing so is
often high.303
Patent scholars generally agree that invalid and unclear patents reduce
social welfare, however, there is little consensus regarding the best
approaches for improving patent examination. Some scholars assert that
the U.S. Patent Office should require inventors to provide more
information to the examiners to facilitate the review of their patent
applications.304 Other scholars reject this approach, arguing that increasing
the burdens on patent applicants is not cost justified because very few
patents warrant such expenditures.305 For example, by one estimate only
5% of patents produce any revenue.306 Investing additional resources in the
examination of all patent applications would not be “rational” since such
additional examination efforts could not produce any benefits in the vast
majority of cases.307
298. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
299. Surden, supra note 54, at 1747.
300. Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1227 (listing the private and social costs resulting from
invalid patents); see also supra Section II.B.
301. See Surden, supra note 54, at 1752–55 (discussing costs stemming from patents with
unclear scope).
302. Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1227; Surden, supra note 54, at 1752–55.
303. See Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1229 (noting high litigation costs as a subset of
high transaction costs).
304. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 203–05 (2005) (proposing that because inventors can
easily provide supplemental information at a very small added cost, inventors should include a
glossary of terms in their patent applications); Surden, supra note 54, at 1809–10. At the urging of
the Obama Administration, the U.S. Patent Office has recently begun exploring the use of glossaries
to increase patent clarity. See Glossary Initiative, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/glossary_initiative.jsp (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
305. See Lemley, supra note 58, at 1507.
306. Id.; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 100 (“[T]he majority of patents are not
worth more than a few thousand dollars.”).
307. See Hubbard, supra note 267, at 359–60; Lemley, supra note 60, at 1497; Miller, supra
note 304, at 196.
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The debate regarding the efficacy of the U.S. Patent Office is framed
only in terms of neoclassical economics. Some scholars contend that the
traditional benefits of investing additional resources in patent examination
exceed the traditional costs, while other scholars dispute this calculation.
All of these scholars, however, implicitly assume that additional
investments are the only mechanism for increasing the productivity of
“rational” patent examiners.308 Productive inefficiency analysis rejects this
assumption and recognizes that market conditions can affect the
productivity of individuals and organizations. In fact, it is highly likely that
the Patent Office suffers from substantial productive inefficiencies because
it faces virtually no competition. The U.S. Patent Office is the only entity
that can issue patents that provide exclusive rights to make, use, or sell an
invention throughout the United States, which is the largest market in the
world.309 With this monopoly, the U.S. Patent Office evades the
disciplining effects of competition.310
Productive inefficiency analysis thus suggests potential mechanisms for
improving processes at the Patent Office. In the absence of competition,
the Patent Office should use managerial oversight to increase the
productive efficiency of patent examiners. Admittedly, this has been the
traditional approach to improving examiner output at the Patent Office, and
as described above, management faces many challenges in doing so. For
example, it is difficult for management to know how many patent
applications a focused and diligent examiner could process in a given time
period.311
Recent changes to U.S. patent law may help to fill this information
void. Specifically, in 2010, the U.S. Patent Office opened a satellite branch
in Detroit, Michigan.312 Similarly, in passing the Leahy–Smith America
Invents Act in the fall of 2011, Congress required the Patent Office to
“establish 3 or more satellite offices in the United States to carry out the
responsibilities of the Office.”313 Pursuant to this mandate, the Patent
Office announced in July 2012 plans to open regional U.S. Patent and
Trademark Offices near Dallas, Denver, and Silicon Valley.314
308. See Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 14, at 1248–50 (critiquing other scholars for failing to
recognize the effects of bounded rationality on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
309. Hubbard, supra note 13, at 1935–38 (characterizing the United States as “the largest
consumer market in the world”).
310. See FRANTZ, supra note 17, at 136.
311. See supra notes 149–54 and accompanying text.
312. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Opens First-Ever Satellite Office in Detroit, Michigan,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 13, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-41.jsp.
313. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 23, 125 Stat. 284, 336–37
(2011).
314. U.S. Commerce Department to Open Four Regional U.S. Patent Offices That Will Speed
Up the Patent Process and Help American Businesses Innovate, Grow, and Create Jobs, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 2, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-40.jsp.
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Although the details of these offices are still coalescing, the Patent
Office and Congress could create conditions that emulate competition
among the offices in at least three respects.315 First, allowing each office to
hire its own examiners would allow the offices to compete with each other
for talented personnel. Second, Congress could tie the funding for each
office to the office’s performance in some respects. For example, if
inventors are able to choose freely which office will review their
applications, Congress could use the number of applications to an office to
determine funding for each office. If the Dallas office were to reduce
examination delays or develop a reputation for issuing patents that were
less likely to be invalid, more inventors might file applications with that
office, thereby increasing the funding for the Dallas office. Some of that
largess might be passed on to the examiners either in the form of higher
salaries or perks, thereby encouraging the examiners to increase their
productivity. Because inventors might gravitate towards an office that
applies lower standards of patentability, Congress might also reduce
funding based on the frequency of patents from each office being held
invalid in litigation. Third, if the U.S. Patent Office were to collect and
disseminate information regarding the productivity of each office,
comparisons between the different offices may help managers in some
offices to reduce examiner productive inefficiencies. For instance, if
examiners in the Dallas office work more expeditiously than examiners in
the Detroit office, managers in the Detroit office might apply greater
pressure on their examiners to improve their productivity. Similarly, one
office could learn of successful work flow mechanisms by hiring
examiners away from a “competitor” satellite office.
CONCLUSION
The effects of patent law on society are undoubtedly complex. Patents
can benefit society by stimulating socially beneficial invention.
Nevertheless, patents also limit competition and thus can deny society the
benefits that robust competition produces. In seeking to understand this
trade-off, lawmakers and scholars have relied upon traditional—but
simplified—economics, including the foundational assumption that firms
always maximize their profits.
Modern economic scholarship acknowledges that, in reality, individuals
and firms often do not maximize their profits due to productive
inefficiencies. For instance, cognitive biases, bounded rationality, and bad
habits cause individuals to fail to maximize their own welfare. Moreover,
employees often opportunistically pursue personal objectives that
undermine firm profits. Rather than assiduously working to maximize firm
315. See Posner, supra note 5, at 574 (noting that even multiple local monopolies in different
regions can provide “sufficient diversity to produce many useful examples for emulation by the
others”).
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profits, employees may seek on-the-job leisure, personal relationships,
perquisites, and status. When patents or other forces restrict competition,
productive inefficiencies can take root.
Unfortunately, legal scholars and policy makers have overlooked
productive inefficiencies and have ignored a substantial cost associated
with patent protection. The critique that economist A.T. Hadley made of
economics more than a century ago applies with equal force to patent
scholarship today: “We have been so accustomed to think of competition
as a regulator of prices that we have lost sight of its equally important
function as a stimulus to efficiency.”316 To better calibrate patent law for
social benefit, lawmakers should consider all of the costs and benefits
stemming from patent protection, including both those described by
traditional economics as well as the costs from productive inefficiencies.
Indeed, the more fulsome approach to patent analysis described in this
Article sheds light on unresolved and long-running debates regarding the
commercialization of patented inventions, the optimal scope of patents on
chemical compounds, and the improvement of patent examination.

316. Hadley, supra note 134, at 383.
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